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ACTION REPORT

WO JIMA

FEBRUARY, 1945

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JUN 21 1965

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

ORIGINATOR'S ROUGH DRAFT

From: CTF 12
To: TF 32, TF 54

Action To: _____

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COMMANDER TASK FORCE FIFTY-TWO
AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT FORCE

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE

ACS 22

14 MAR 1945

NR

Instructors Reading this Document

Sign Below (**File No.** -----)

Name ----- **Date** -----

11-7733

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
File: Al6-3(2) Fleet Post Office
Serial: 0013 San Francisco, California

JUN 21 1965

7 March 1945

JUN 1965

From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE.
To: Distribution.

Subject: Report of Operations of Task Force 52 in the LWO JEMA
Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February -
Deletions in.

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Reference: (a) CTF 52 Secret File Al6-3(2), serial 009 of 22 February
1945.

1. Upon receipt of this letter, all Commands designated as
holders of the subject report will delete the code words appearing in the
following pages:

A-26, in entry for 0757
A-27, in entry for 0856
A-28, in entry for 1056
A-30, in entry for 1421
A-32, in entry for 1720 and 1817
A-34, in entry for 0641
A-44, in entry for 1825
D-9, subparagraph (f), second line.

W.H.P. BLANDY.

Distribution:

Same as for Subject Report, reference (a).

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Flag Secretary.

21 MAR 1945

NR

OM 1134

JUN 21 1965

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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File: A16-3(2)

Serial: 009

22 February 1945.
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,
EXCEPT AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR S200.10

From: Commander Task Force 52 (Amphibious Support Force),
(Rear Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, USN, Commander
Amphibious Group ONE, U. S.S. ESTES, Flagship).
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Joint
Expeditionary Force and Commander Amphibious
Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(2) Commander FIFTH Fleet.
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan;
Report of.

Enclosures: (A) Chronology of Operations.
(B) Comments on Intelligence.
(C) Comments on Ships' Gunfire Support.
(D) Report on Support Aircraft Operations.
(E) Comments on UDT Operations.
(F) Comments on Minesweeping.
(G) Comments on Battle Damage.
(H) Comments on Medical Facilities and Casualties.
(I) Comments on Weather.
(J) Comments on Communications.

1. The function of this command during subject period was to exercise general supervision over, and coordinate, all activities at the objective prior to the arrival of the landing and assault elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force on DOG Day (19 February). The forces participating in these pre-landing activities of Task Force 52 were:

- (a) The Gunfire and Covering Force, Task Force 54, under command of Rear Admiral B.J. Rodgers, USN (Commander Amphibious Group ELEVEN), consisting of 6 OBB, 4 CA, 1 CL, 15 DD, 1 DM, and 1 AVD.
- (b) The Support Carrier Group, Task Group 52.2 under command of Rear Admiral C.T. Durgin, USN (Commander Escort Carriers, U.S. Pacific Fleet), consisting of 8 CVE, 5 DD and 9 DE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600 (K) 11 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

- (c) The Mine Group, Task Group 52.3, under command of Rear Admiral A. Sharp, USN (Commander Minecraft, U.S. Pacific Fleet), consisting of seven Sweep Units comprising 43 minecraft plus 8 LCP(R)'s rigged for shallow water minesweeping.
- (d) The Underwater Demolition Group, Task Group 52.4, under command of Captain B.H. Hanlon, USN (Commander Underwater Demolition Teams, U.S. Pacific Fleet), consisting of 6 APD's carrying UDT's Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15.
- (e) Gunboat Support Units One and Two, Task Units 52.5.1 and 52.5.2, under command of Commander M.J. Malanaphy, USN (Commander LCI Flotilla Three), consisting of 1 LCI(L) and 12 LCI(G)'s.
- (f) Land-based heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, Task Force 93, delivered air strikes under the control of Commander Air Support Control Unit, Task Group 52.10, Captain E.C. Parker, USN, embarked in the flagship of Commander Task Force 52, when weather permitted.

2. The mission of forces under this command was to effect the maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and defenses of IWO JIMA by aircraft and surface ship bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition, during the period D -3 to D -1, inclusive, in order to facilitate its capture.

3. Intensive planning by this command for this campaign commenced on 15 October at PEARL HARBOR. It was greatly facilitated by the presence in this location, during the early period of the planning stage, of Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R.A. Spruance, USN.), Commander Joint Expeditionary Force (CTF 51, Vice Admiral R.K. Turner, USN, Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet), Commander Attack Force (CTF 53, Rear Admiral H.W. Hill, USN, Commander Amphibious Group TWO), Commander Expeditionary Troops (CTF 56, Lieutenant General H.M. Smith, USMC), Commander Landing Force (CTG 56.1, Major General H. Schmidt, USMC), CTG 52.3 and CTG 52.4. Joint conferences were held and members of the staff of this command worked continuously with the staffs of the above commands.

4. CTF 52 issued his Operation Plan No. A101-45, on 1 January, 1945, and sailed for ULITHI on 12 January in his flagship, ESTES, accompanied by NEVADA and IDAHO, the transport ADMIRAL COONTZ,

UNCLASSIFIED
-2-

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

and screening ships, in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No. A102-45, and arrived ULITHI on 23 January (East Longitude Date). Gunnery and other training exercises were held enroute. Intensive drills for the Staff and Air Support Control Unit were conducted, in the form of battle problems covering each period of the operation at IWO JIMA.

5. Prior to departure from PEARL HARBOR, it had been expected that ships and commanders of TF 54, TG 52.2, TG 52.4, and Gunboat Support Units One and Two would be assembled at ULITHI by 24-27 January, and that the period from their arrival to 10 February, the date of departure, could be devoted to intensive briefing and conferences, training, and rehearsals, as well as logistic replenishment. While CTF 52 was enroute ULITHI it became apparent that delay in releasing certain ships then engaged in operations against LUZON, as well as damage sustained by these ships, would not only prevent their assembly at ULITHI, but would prevent their participation in operations at IWO JIMA, and that extensive changes to existing plans, particularly the ships' gunfire support plan, would be necessary. Furthermore, it developed that Vice Admiral J.B. Olendorf, USN (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE), would not command TF 54. Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plan 13-44 originally provided that heavy ships of TF 54 would consist of CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, MISSISSIPPI, NEW MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, TEXAS, LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, INDIANAPOLIS, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PENSACOLA and SALT LAKE CITY. When it became apparent that participation of many of these ships would not be possible, CTF 51 revised his plan to include, for the period D -3 to D -1, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, TENNESSEE, IDAHO, NEVADA, NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, and TUSCALOOSA. He reprinted the intricate and detailed schedules of ships' gunfire on this basis, and advance copies were delivered to CTF 52 on 28 January by Rear Admiral Rodgers, who flew out from PEARL HARBOR to become CTF 54 in place of Vice Admiral Olendorf. By the time these changed plans arrived, however, Commander FIFTH Fleet had indicated that NORTH CAROLINA, and WASHINGTON would not be available until DOG Day, but that VICKSBURG would join TF 54 at SAIPAN. As CTF 51 was now at sea, and there was not time for him to issue further changes upon his arrival at ENIWETOK, CTF 52 at once prepared pen and ink changes to the Ships Gunfire Support Plan Annex of CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44 to cover these changes in task organization, informed CTF 51 that copies of these changes would reach him at ENIWETOK on 6 February, and that meanwhile fire support ships present at ULITHI would be briefed in accordance therewith.

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600 (K) 12 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

CTF 51 approved the proposed changes. Advance copies of Change No. 3 to his OpPlan, covering the latest changes in task organization, were received on 6 February and delivered to ships of TF 51 present at ULITHI, forthwith, as well as to such ships of TF 58 as might be called upon for fire support duties. In the meanwhile communications training of fire support ships and support aircraft, and two rehearsals of UDT operations, the second including actual fire support, were conducted. Conferences were held with CTG 52.2, CTG 52.3, CTG 52.4, and on 8 February there was a general conference and briefing attended by Commanding Officers of all ships present of TF 52, TF 54, possible fire support ships of TF 58, and many of the higher echelons of these commands. The Staff Gunnery Officer and Intelligence Officer had in the interim briefed gunnery officers and top and air spotters of fire support ships. Ships of the Support Carrier Group and carriers of TF 58 were also briefed. Emphasis was placed upon the necessity for confining the preliminary bombardment to deliberate destructive fire against installations which would threaten planes, ships, and the actual landing. In view of the great number of defense installations, time and ammunition did not permit fire at targets of lower priority. This subject is treated more fully in enclosures (C) and (D). Three additional CVE's were assigned to TG 52.2 prior to departure of ships of TF's 52 and 54 on 10 February.

6. Passage from ULITHI to SAIPAN was uneventful. February 12 and 13 were devoted to a rehearsal of DOG Day operations on each day, delivery of plans and orders to NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, TERRY and MULLANY which joined at SAIPAN, and fueling screening vessels. A party was sent aboard to brief the NEW YORK. It was possible to bring gunnery officers and spotters of TENNESSEE and VICKSBURG on board ESTES for briefing which included demonstration of specific enemy installations in areas of responsibility of these ships by means of photographs. Passage from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA, in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No. A105-45, was uneventful.

7. The general plan of operations at IWO JIMA for 16 February consisted, briefly, of sweeping adjacent waters to within approximately 6000 yards of the shore, gunfire at long (above 12000 yards) and medium (from 6000 to 12000 yards) ranges with air spot for destruction of defenses and silencing of enemy batteries, air strikes by support carrier aircraft and land-based heavy bombers of TF 93, examination of beaches from the air by special hydrographic observers, aircraft photo missions in late morning and afternoon, installation of a navigational light on HIGASHI IWA, a small rocky

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

islet about 3000 yards to the eastward of IWO JIMA, and early morning and late afternoon fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIMA to destroy planes and ships or boats which might interfere with the operation. Fire support ships were to follow minesweeping units in towards the island and then work in their assigned sectors inside a screen of destroyers and APD's which enclosed the island area. APD's were to conduct visual reconnaissance of beaches, but not to approach closer than 3000 yards. This plan was followed, except that low ceiling and intermittent showers prevented the photo mission, the morning strike against CHICHI JIMA, the strike of land-based bombers, and severely handicapped the spotting planes. CTF 52, in order to prevent waste of ammunition, directed ships to fire only when efficient air spot was available. It was not possible to follow the planned firing schedules, and instead each ship fired in its assigned area of responsibility whenever weather permitted. Two enemy luggers were discovered early in the morning by support aircraft about 30 miles west of SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. They were attacked and left burning and in a sinking condition, with crews abandoning ship. In the early afternoon a PENSACOLA spotting plane reported shooting down a Zeke which had apparently taken off from IWO JIMA. Three Betty's were strafed and probably destroyed on the ground. A battery which opened fire on minesweepers from northern flank of eastern beach was quickly silenced by fire support ships. None of our ships was hit. One fighter plane and pilot became lost in thick weather and did not return. One plane was an operational loss. One fighter plane was shot down by enemy AA but the pilot was recovered uninjured. One NEW YORK spotting plane was damaged on catapulting, and sank after personnel were removed. Results of minesweeping were negative, but one old mine adrift was sighted and sunk. Excellent reports were received from the air hydrographic observer indicating that beaches and surf conditions would permit landings by any type of landing craft. He could see no evidence of underwater defenses. Lack of photographs and the paucity of observed results by ships and aircraft prevented accurate assessment of damage to enemy installations. It was estimated, however, that the comparatively small amount of firing permitted by the intermittent thick weather had inflicted little damage on major defenses. Pilots reported enemy heavy AA gunfire not particularly intense or effective, and fire of Automatic AA intense but generally inaccurate.

8. At sunset all ships commenced night deployment away from the island, except for four destroyers which were designated to remain and provide harassing fire and illumination, interdict the

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Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

use and repair of airfields, and prevent escape or reinforcement of the garrison. CTF 52 in ESTES, screened by 4 AM's, after following the fire support units away from the island during dusk, returned to the vicinity of the island to supervise night operations.

9. Operations planned for 17 February consisted in general of morning and evening fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIMA; close range destructive fire against eastern beach defenses during which minesweeping up to about 150 yards from the eastern shore would be covered by the heavy ships; UDT reconnaissance of eastern beaches in the late morning closely supported by heavy ships, 7 destroyers and 7 LCI(G)'s; strikes by land-based bombers at 1330; close range destructive fire on western beaches; minesweeping off western beaches and UDT reconnaissance of these beaches supported as in the morning; minesweeping to within about 2000 yards of the northern and northeastern shore; hydrographic observation of beach conditions from the air, photo missions, and night operations at the objective as on 16 February. At 0124(K) ComDesDiv 111 in NEWCOMB, with HALLIGAN, was directed to proceed to point (Lat 26°-00 N, Long 141°-50' E) and to act as radar pickets and provide life guard services for air strikes against CHICHI JIMA. At 0641(K) HALLIGAN was attacked by three Betty's when 24 miles, bearing 355°, from SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. She drove off the attackers, shooting down one Betty. Fire support ships arrived on station and commenced the scheduled bombardment promptly at 0700(K). Mine Unit Two, in company with Gunboat Support Units One and Two, arrived at 0700(K). Gunboat support units reported to CTG 52.4 and Sweep Units 5 and 6 to CTG 52.3. A special air strike group of 12 VF's departed for CHICHI JIMA at 0735(K). The first support air strike group reported on station at 0715(K). During the day many air strikes were launched against the objective through meager to intense heavy and light anti-aircraft fire. Photographic missions were completed, but the morning verticals were poor, preventing accurate damage assessment. The fire support ships were ordered to close the eastern beaches at 0803(K) for close destructive bombardment. Under cover of this fire, and supported by two destroyers, Sweep Units 5 and 6 proceeded with operations along the eastern shore. APD's with UDT's embarked, destroyers and LCI(G)'s began assembling off the eastern beaches about 0930 for execution of the UDT reconnaissance. At 0938 the PENSACOLA, off the northeastern shore, was observed to be under fire by apparently quite heavy caliber guns as some splashes appeared to be almost as high as her foremast. She sustained extensive damage and many casualties. A plane was set on fire. The ship continued

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 and the JMA Campaign
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan;
Report of.

to fire as she withdrew to extinguish the fires and repair damage. She continued to carry out her mission, ceasing fire from time to time while casualties were being operated on and given blood transfusions. CTG 52.3 requested additional support for Sweep Unit 4 working off the northeastern shore, and VICKSBURG was ordered to provide it. By 1048(K) all units were in position to commence the UDT reconnaissance set for 1100(K). The last of the minesweepers was completing the sweep off the eastern beaches, these small ships having gallantly passed close along the eastern shore in precise formation, firing as they went, without deviation from their prescribed tracks although under occasional enemy fire. The UDT reconnaissance commenced exactly on schedule. As the LCI(G)'s moved in toward the beach, enemy fire began to concentrate on them. By 1105(K), when they reached a point 1000 yards off shore, enemy fire was intense from both medium and minor caliber weapons on the flanks and minor caliber along the beaches. The personnel of these little gunboats displayed magnificent courage as they returned fire with everything they had and refused to move out until they were forced to do so by materiel and personnel casualties. Even then, after undergoing terrific punishment, some returned to their stations amid a hail of fire, until again heavily hit. Relief LCI(G)'s replaced damaged ships without hesitation. Between 1100(K) and 1145(K) all twelve of the LCI(G)'s were hit. LCI 474 ultimately capsized after the crew had been removed, and was ordered sunk. Intensive fire from destroyers and fire support ships, and a smoke screen laid by white phosphorus projectiles, were used to cover this operation. Fire support ships took on board casualties from the LCI(G)'s as they withdrew, and CTG 52.3 in TERROR most promptly and efficiently initiated emergency repairs for serious hull damage, as well as assisting in care of the wounded. At 1121(K) LEUTZE was hit, the Commanding Officer receiving serious injuries, requiring his later transfer to ESTES, but no extensive damage was sustained by the ship. By 1220(K) all swimmers of the UDT's but one had been recovered, and the APD's and supporting destroyers moved out of the area. The reconnaissance had been accomplished. It disclosed no underwater or beach obstructions and no minefields, though one J13 "reef mine" was reported in 8 feet of water off the north flank of Red 2 Beach. Beach and surf conditions were found to be good for landing.

10. Early in the afternoon heavy fire support ships were ordered to close the western beaches and commence destructive short-range fire. At 1354(K) three squadrons of land-based bombers of

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Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

Task Force 93 commenced bombing runs on the objective. The first squadron encountered little large caliber AA fire, but this fire increased in intensity and accuracy as the second and third squadrons commenced their runs. It was learned later that one plane received major damage, and a few others minor damage, but that all were able to return to base. The bombing was conducted from about 5000 feet altitude, and appeared to be most precise. Under cover of close-in fire support ships with two destroyers in direct support, Sweep Units 5 and 6 swept the area close to the western beaches, without drawing more than sporadic fire from the island. UDT reconnaissance of the western beaches was commenced at 1615(K). The support was modified in that no LCI(G)'s were used and the destroyers were ordered to close from 3000 yards to 2000 yards. A smoke screen by aircraft was ordered but the smoke planes had difficulty in complying, as the screen was not laid until 20 minutes after the order, and was not placed where ordered. The operation was partially screened by white phosphorus projectiles laid on the northern and southern flanks, and behind the beaches. The UDT's accomplished the reconnaissance successfully. One mine was found and a delay charge placed to destroy it. Minefields or underwater obstacles were determined to be non-existent, and beaches and surf conditions were found to be suitable for landing.

11. At 1734(K), HOWARD reported rescuing 3 men from a crashed TBF. Night deployment commenced about 1830(K). EDWARDS, TWIGGS and STEMBEL were designated to remain at the objective to execute night harassing fire, interdiction of airfields, prevent escape or reinforcement of the garrison, and to maintain careful surveillance of the beaches to ensure that the enemy did no work on them. MULLANY, APD's of TG 52.4 and Sweep Unit 4 remained with ESTES in the vicinity of the objective, as did the Gunboat Support Units One and Two. Shortly after dark TWIGGS shot down one enemy plane near the island. At 2321(K) WATERS and BULL were despatched with beach charts and personnel from the UDT's for distribution and dissemination of information on the beach reconnaissances to CTF 51, CTF 53, and designated elements of the Attack Force. Strikes on CHICHI JIMA resulted in damage to about 18 small craft and an ammunition barge blown up. At HABA JIMA about 15 small and 1 medium sized craft were damaged. It was estimated, and examination of the afternoon photographs confirmed, that the greater part of major known defensive installations still remained undamaged. However, heavily casemated batteries at the northern base of SURIBACHI (already on map) and on the right flank of the eastern beaches

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Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

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Report of.

(3 of the 4 guns not on map) had been definitely located. Orders were issued changing schedules of fire for 18 February to provide for heavy concentration of destructive fire from short range on the blockhouses, pill boxes etc., of the eastern beach area, and defenses behind it and on each flank. For knocking out the heavy flanking batteries a cross fire by IDAHO and TENNESSEE was directed. It was felt that unless this was done, the success of the landing itself would be seriously jeopardized, even though it was realized that guns and mortars in other areas would probably give trouble after the landing. Fire support ships were advised of the entire situation, and directed to make every effort to obtain the greatest possible effect from each remaining round of ammunition and minute of time.

12. At 0308(K) on 18 February MULLANY was sent to rendezvous with LUNGA POINT with photographs for delivery by plane that morning to CTF 51 and various elements of the Attack Force. Minesweeping commenced on schedule. Fire support ships were on station at 0700(K) and off the eastern beaches delivered almost continuous fire from 0700(K) to 1830(K) at ranges of from 1800 to 3000 yards from the shore. Other ships fired at targets in other areas throughout the same period. TEXAS, assisted by two destroyers, also covered uncompleted minesweeping operations off the northern shore. During the afternoon a TEXAS spotting plane recovered a downed pilot, uninjured, from 135 miles at sea. He had been sighted by a B29 of the 21st Bomber Command.

13. Night deployments were commenced at sunset, except that 5 destroyers were assigned to usual night operations at the objective, with special instructions to ensure that no work by the enemy was accomplished on the beaches. By late afternoon all minesweeping necessary to permit a successful landing, and its support and the ensuing unloading, had been accomplished. No mines were found. Reports from firing ships and examination of photographs showed that the principal defensive installations on and behind the eastern beaches, and on their flanks, had been either destroyed or heavily damaged. Among these were included the casemated batteries on the northern and southern flanks of the beaches, which were estimated to have fired on the LCI(G)'s with such telling effect on 17 February. Fragments recovered from LCI(G)'s indicated that the heaviest of these guns were about 150mm in caliber. During the evening CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that although weather had prevented expending the full ammunition allowance, and that more installations could be found and destroyed with an additional day of bombardment,

UNCLASSIFIED
- 9 -

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to plan; Report of.

UNCLASSIFIED

he believed a successful landing could be made on 19 February if necessary. At 2130(K) BLESSMAN was bombed and disabled by a low flying plane. GILMER proceeded to her assistance, and ARDENT was sent to take her in tow. At 2255(K) GAMBLE was hit and disabled under similar circumstances. HAMILTON and CHANDLER stood by, and HAMILTON took GAMBLE in tow. CTF 51 was requested to send salvage ships to rendezvous with these disabled ships as soon as possible. ESTES and CHESTER each proceeding independently, were in collision at 0600(K) on 19 February. Damage to ESTES was slight and operating efficiency not impaired. CHESTER was able to complete her fire support mission but was then ordered to SAIPAN for repairs as one propellor was bent and the deck buckled so that turret three was not in operating condition. At 0600(K) CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to plan, and ComPhibGroup ONE became CTG 51.19.

14. This operation clearly demonstrated that previous high altitude bombings and long range bombardment of IWO JIMA directed only into "target areas" achieved negligible damage to the very numerous defenses of the island, which were stout, comparatively small, and well dispersed. Photographic interpretation shows, on the contrary, that the defenses were substantially increased in number during December, January, and early February. The bombardment by this force on 16 and 17 February also had less than the desired effect, due to interference by weather, to the need for giving way to minesweeping and UDT operations, and by lack of thorough familiarity with the actual important targets, as distinguished from a mark on a map, or a photograph. It was not until after fire support ships their spotting planes and the support aircraft had worked at the objective for two days, had become familiar with the location and appearance of the defenses, and had accurately attacked them with close range gunfire and low altitude air strikes, that substantial results were achieved. This experience emphasizes once again the need for ample time as well as ample ships, aircraft and ammunition, for preliminary reduction of defenses of a strongly defended position. At the same time it is realized that certain defenses will never be destroyed or even discovered until after the troops land.

15. It is worthy of note that the defenders did not employ heavy guns against minesweepers even when they worked close to the shore. Perhaps this was because the Japanese knew there were no minefields to defend and considered that damage to minesweepers would not compensate for disclosure of batteries to the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

fire support ships. When, however, the LCI(G)'s approached the beach in support of the UDT's, it was logical for the Japanese to assume that being landing craft, they were being employed to carry and land troops. The Japanese therefore opened up with everything they had to defeat the supposed landing. It is therefore considered that LCI(G)'s or craft of that general type should not be used to support UDT's working in the vicinity of strongly defended positions, unless the major defenses are assuredly destroyed beforehand, or unless sufficient ammunition is available to permit the same heavy smothering fire as is used in conjunction with an actual landing.

16. The large Staff of an Amphibious Group Commander was needed to achieve coordination of the many and mutually conflicting activities at the objective during the pre-landing period. The trained teams which are accustomed to working as a well knit unit in controlling naval gunfire and support aircraft so that each of these weapons will effectively supplement the other are considered to be a necessity, as are the ample communications, photographic, photo interpretation, map reproduction and housing facilities, and working spaces, of an AGC. For this operation the Staff was augmented by four assistants in the Gunnery Section, and one assistant and two photo interpreters in the Intelligence Section. The services of these additional officers were fully employed and a similar arrangement is strongly recommended for future operations of this type. Familiarity with the problems confronting the Amphibious Force, and the presence of the Naval Gunfire Officer of the Staff of the 5th Amphibious Corps, were of material assistance in modifying plans and methods of attacking defensive installations to suit new developments of the situation as they arose. It is believed that factors discussed above will assume added importance in future pre-landing operations of larger scope and greater complexity.

17. In the interest of expediting this report, comments on Naval Gunfire Support, Support Aircraft Operations, Minesweeping, and UDT Operations are being forwarded herewith prior to receipt of reports from the Task Force and Task Group Commanders who immediately directed these activities. These comments have therefore been prepared from the information at hand on the date of this report. Additional comments will be submitted by endorsement upon the reports of the Commanders of these operations.

W.H.P. BLANDY.

UNCLASSIFIED
-11-

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the TWO JIMA Campaign
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan;
Report of

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ComPhibGrpELEVEN	(5)	ComBatDiv 5	(1)
ComPhibGrpTWELVE	(2)	ComBatDiv 6	(1)
ComPhibGrpTHIRTEEN	(2)		
ComPhibGrpFOURTEEN	(2)	ComCruDiv 4	(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0800(H) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

ComCruDiv 5	(1)	RICHARD P. LEARY (DD 664)	(1)
ComCruDiv 6	(1)	HALL (DD 583)	(1)
ComCruDiv 13	(1)	HALLIGAN (DD 584)	(1)
ComCruDiv 14	(1)	TERRY (DD 513)	(1)
ComCruDiv 17	(1)	PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590)	(1)
ComCruDiv 19	(1)	STEMBEL (DD 644)	(1)
		JOHN D. HENLEY (DD 553)	(1)
ComDesDiv 11	(1)	CAPPS (DD 550)	(1)
ComDesDiv 91	(1)	BRYANT (DD 665)	(1)
ComDesDiv 101	(1)	TWIGGS (DD 591)	(1)
ComDesDiv 111	(1)	LEUTZE (DD 481)	(1)
ComDesDiv 112	(1)	MULLANY (DD 528)	(1)
		H.A. WILEY (DM 29)	(1)
ComCortDiv 63	(1)	WILLIAMSON (AVD 2)	(1)
ComCortDiv 72	(1)		
		ComEsCarForPac	(2)
ARKANSAS (BB 33)	(1)	ComCarDiv 25	(1)
NEW YORK (BB 34)	(1)	ComCarDiv 26	(1)
TEXAS (BB 35)	(1)	MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)	(1)
NEVADA (BB 36)	(1)	SARGENT BAY (CVE 83)	(1)
IDAHO (BB 42)	(1)	WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65)	(1)
TENNESSEE (BB 43)	(1)	LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)	(1)
WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48)	(1)	ANZIO (CVE 57)	(1)
NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55)	(1)	NATOMA BAY (CVE 62)	(1)
WASHINGTON (BB 56)	(1)	STEAMER BAY (CVE 87)	(1)
PENSACOLA (CA 24)	(1)	DALY (DD 519)	(1)
SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25)	(1)	RALPH TALBOT (DD 390)	(1)
CHESTER (CA 27)	(1)	GRADY (DE 445)	(1)
INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35)	(1)	RICHARD S. BULL (DE 402)	(1)
TUSCALOOSA (CA 37)	(1)	HUTCHINS (DD 476)	(1)
SAN FRANCISCO (CA 38)	(1)	HELM (DD 388)	(1)
BOSTON (CA 69)	(1)	BAGLEY (DD 386)	(1)
PITTSBURG (CA 72)	(1)	RICHARD M. ROWELL (DE 403)	(1)
SANTA FE (CL 60)	(1)	O'FLAHERTY (DE 340)	(1)
PASADENA (CL 65)	(1)	LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR (DE 415)	(1)
BILOXI (CL 80)	(1)	MELVIN R. NAWMAN (DE 416)	(1)
VICKSBURG (CL 86)	(1)	OLIVER MITCHELL (DE 417)	(1)
ASTORIA (CL 90)	(1)	TABBERER (DE 418)	(1)
		ROBERT F. KELLER (DE 419)	(1)
NEWCOMB (DD 586)	(1)		
BENNION (DD 662)	(1)	CominPac	(3)
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD663)	(1)	CominRon 2	(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the TWO JMA Campaign
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan;
Report of.

UNCLASSIFIED

CominDiv 10	(1)	SC 1054	(1)
CominDiv 35	(1)		
CominDiv 36	(1)	ComUDT'sPac	(1)
TERROR (CM 5)	(1)	GILMER (APD 11)	(1)
HOPKINS (DMS 13)	(1)	WATERS (APD 8)	(1)
DORSEY (DMS 1)	(1)	BULL (APD 78)	(1)
HOWARD (DMS 7)	(1)	BLESSMAN (APD 48)	(1)
HOGAN (DMS 6)	(1)	BARR (APD 39)	(1)
BREESE (DM 18)	(1)	BATES (APD 47)	(1)
SKIRMISH (AM 303)	(1)	UDT 12 (in APD 47)	(1)
SIGNET (AM 302)	(1)	UDT 13 (in APD 39)	(1)
STAUNCH (AM 307)	(1)	UDT 14 (in APD 78)	(1)
SCURRY (AM 304)	(1)	UDT 15 (in APD 48)	(1)
SPECTACLE (AM 305)	(1)		
SPECTOR (AM 306)	(1)	ComLCIFlot 3	(1)
TRACY (DM 19)	(1)	ComLCIGroup 8	(1)
SERENE (AM 300)	(1)	LCI(L) 627	(1)
SHELTER (AM 301)	(1)	LCI(G) 450	(1)
STRATEGY (AM 308)	(1)	LCI(G) 466	(1)
STRENGTH (AM 309)	(1)	LCI(G) 469	(1)
SUCCESS (AM 310)	(1)	LCI(G) 471	(1)
REBEL (AM 284)	(1)	LCI(G) 473	(1)
PC 809	(1)	LCI(G) 346	(1)
CHAMPION (AM 314)	(1)	LCI(G) 348	(1)
ARDENT (AM 340)	(1)	LCI(G) 438	(1)
DEFENSE (AM 317)	(1)	LCI(G) 441	(1)
DEVASTATOR (AM 318)	(1)	LCI(G) 449	(1)
GAMBLE (DM 15)	(1)	LCI(G) 457	(1)
YMS 323	(1)		
YMS 362	(1)	ESTES (AGC 12)	(3)
YMS 374	(1)	ComASCU,PhibGrpONE	(3)
YMS 401	(1)	CominPac,Rep,PhibGrpONE	(1)
YMS 411	(1)		
YMS 478	(1)	CNO	(5)
LINDSEY (DM 32)	(1)	CNO (ONI)	(3)
SC 775	(1)	ARMY & NAVY STAFF COLLEGE	(1)
SC 1027	(1)	C & Gs SCHOOL, LEAVENWORTH	(1)
YMS 193	(1)	NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	(1)
YMS 235	(1)	COMDT. MARINE CORPS	(1)
YMS 345	(1)	COMDT. MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS	(1)
YMS 361	(1)	ComPhibTraLant	(1)
YMS 407	(1)	ComPhibTraPac	(1)
YMS 475	(1)	PhibTraBase,Ft.Pierce,Fla.	(1)

L. D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

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CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS

10 January 1945

0750(VW) TG 52.11 commenced sortie from PEARL HARBOR for movement to ULITHI in accordance with ComPhibGroupONE Movement Order A102-45. Task Organization: CTG 52.11, Rear Admiral BLANDY, OTC; ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship; Battleships TEXAS and NEVADA; Transport Unit ADMIRAL COONTZ; Screen, TransDiv 101, WATERS, BATES, BARR, GILMER and WILLIAMSON.

0945(VW) CTG 52.11 assumed tactical command.

0958 Set course 225° T.; standard speed 13 knots.

1017 Commenced antiaircraft practice.

1200 Noon Position: 20°-42.7' N.; 158°-14.6' W.

1305 Ceased present exercises.

1425 Conducted exercise repelling aircraft attack.

1559 Ceased present exercises.

1800 Changed local time to plus 10 Zone time.

2000(W) Position: 19°-54.5' N.; 159°-45.3' W.

11 January 1945

0600(W) Conducted Exercise 2(c), USF-10A, BATES target.

0800 Position: 19°-34.5' N.; 162°-31.4' W.

0900 Exercised at flag hoist drill.

0955 Secured from flag hoist drill.

1027 Commenced tactical exercises.

1132 Secured from tactical exercises.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

11 January 1945 (continued)

1200(W) Noon Position: 19°-33.2' N.; 163°-20.6' W.
1355 Commenced exercises.
1413 Ceased present exercises.
1700 Set clocks back one half hour to plus 10½ time.
1745(WX) Transferred appendicitis case from GILMER to ESTES.
2000 Position: 19°-24.2' N.; 164°-58.1' W.
2015 Commenced tactical exercises.
2044 Secured from tactical exercises.

12 January 1945

0600(WX) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BARR target.
0800 Position: 19°-01.9' N.; 167°-35' W.
0927 Commenced tactical exercises.
1100 Secured from tactical exercises.
1200 Noon Position: 18°-48.5' N.; 168°-29.9' W.
1301 NEVADA launched two planes. NEVADA conducted Exercise 4(B), USF-10A for NEVADA and TEXAS.
1436 Commenced tactical exercises.
1458 Completed tactical exercises.
1509 NEVADA proceeded independently to recover planes.
1545 NEVADA rejoined formation.
1700 Changed local time to plus 11 time.
2000(X) Position: 18°-29.2' N.; 170°-09.7' W.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

UNCLASSIFIED

13 January 1945

0600(X) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BATES target.
0800 Position: 18°-01.9' N.; 173°-04.7' W.
0900 NEVADA and TEXAS, screened by WATERS, GILMER and WILLIAMSON, left formation for tactical exercises.
1000 Commenced tactical exercises.
1026 Ceased present exercises.
1130 NEVADA, TEXAS and screen rejoined formation.
1200 Noon Position: 17°-49.4' N.; 173°-57.1' W.
1402 Streamed paravanes.
1539 Recovered paravanes.
1700 Changed local time to Zone plus 11½ time.
2000(XY) Position: 17°-27.1' N.; 175°-39.8' W.
2009 Tactical exercises - Sound Contact drill.
2024 Ceased present exercises.

14 January 1945

0738(XY) WILLIAMSON came alongside ESTES to fuel.
0800 Position: 16°-57.5' N.; 178°-28.6' W.
1012 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES.
1059 GILMER alongside ESTES to fuel.
1200 Noon Position: 17°-16.7' N.; 179°-03.6' W.
1210 GILMER cast off from ESTES.
1223 BARR alongside NEVADA to fuel.
1355 BARR cast off from NEVADA.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ILO ILO CAMPAIGN

14 January 1945 (Continued)

1400(XY) WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel.
1600 BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel.
1702 WATERS cast off from TEXAS.
1736 BATES cast off from NEVADA.
1748 Crossed 180th meridian.
2000 Position: 17°-24' N.; 179°-30' E.

15 January 1945

0521(XY) WATERS reported only one engine in operation due to condenser casualty.
0600 Conducted exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BATES target.
0628 ESTES had engineering casualty and left formation.
0640 ESTES in position; resumed guide.
0800 Position: 16°-02.9' N.; 176°-46.4' E.
0919 Commenced tactical exercises.
1037 Ceased tactical exercises.
1200 Noon Position: 15°-37' N.; 175°-53' E.
1400 Flag hoist drill, TEXAS leading.
1518 Conducted exercise 13(A) and 13(B), USF-10A.
1555 Ceased present exercises.
1700 Changed local time to Zone plus 12 time.
2000(Y) Position: 14°-52.5' N.; 174°-06.7' E.
2400 Changed local time to Zone minus 12 time.

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A-4

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 January 1945 (East Longitude Date)

0800(M) Position: 14°-04.4' N.; 171°-12.6' E.

0911 Commenced tactical exercises.

1050 Ceased present exercises.

1100 Commenced radar reporting drill.

1149 Ceased present exercises.

1200 Noon Position: 13°-51.8' N.; 170°-20' E.

1345 BATES reported sound gear out.

1400 Flag hoist drill.

1502 Secured from flag hoist drill.

2000 Position: 13°-18.8' N.; 168°-28.1' E.
 Commenced tactical exercises (Sound Contact drill).

2040 Ceased tactical exercises.

2212 TEXAS had steering casualty.

2215 TEXAS regained steering control.

18 January 1945

0800(M) Position: 12°-20.9' N.; 165°-42.6' E.

0830 TEXAS launched two planes.

0919 Conducted exercise 4(D), USF-10A.

1041 TEXAS left formation to recover planes.

1200 Noon Position: 12°-04.1' N.; 164°-52.9' E.

1210 TEXAS resumed station.

1419 GILMER alongside NEVADA to fuel.

1545 GILMER cast off from NEVADA.

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18 January 1945 (Continued)

1700(M) Changed local time to minus $11\frac{1}{2}$ zone time.
2000(LM) Position: 11° - $12.9'$ N.; 163° - $47.5'$ E.
2015 Commenced tactical exercise (Sound Contact drill).
2033 Ceased tactical exercises.

19 January 1945

0755(LM) BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel.
0800 Position: 10° - $47.4'$ N.; 160° - $53.9'$ E.
0902 BATES cast off from NEVADA.
0922 WILLIAMSON alongside ESTES to fuel.
1116 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES.
1137 WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel.
1200 Noon Position: 10° - $48.5'$ N.; 160° - $13'$ E.
1338 WATERS completed fueling.
1415 BARR alongside NEVADA for fuel.
1520 BARR cast off from NEVADA.
1600 Commenced flag hoist drill.
1700 Secured from flag hoist drill. Changed local time to minus 11 zone time.
2000(L) Position: 10° - $38.6'$ N.; 158° - $29.4'$ E.

20 January 1945

0800(L) Position: 10° - $27.8'$ N.; 155° - $46.4'$ E.
0910 Streamed paravanes.
1108 Recovered paravanes.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

20 January 1945 (Continued)

1125(L) WATERS reported condenser casualty repaired.
1200 Noon Position: 10°-20.8' N.; 155°-00.8' E.
1305 Flag hoist drill, WILLIAMSON conducting.
2000 Position: 10°-15.7' N.; 153°-11.2' E.

21 January 1945

0800(L) Position: 10°-22' N.; 150°-30.9' E.
1200 Noon Position: 10°-24.7' N.; 149°-38.6' E.
1300 Commenced flag hoist drill.
1400 Secured from flag hoist drill.
1700 Changed local time to zone minus 10½ time.
2000(KL) Position: 10°-17' N.; 147°-47' E.

22 January 1945

0800(KL) Position: 10°-01.4' N.; 145°-06.1' E.
1000 Flag hoist drill.
1100 Secured from flag hoist drill.
1200 Noon Position: 09°-59.7' N.; 144°-16.3' E.
1233 Issued Entry Order A104-45 for ULITHI by despatch.
1245 Commander KAUFFMAN transferred to ESTES from GILMER.
1700 Changed local time to minus 10 zone time.
2000(K) Position: 10°-00.8' N.; 142°-38.1' E.

23 January 1945

0650(K) Sighted FAIS Island, ULITHI, bearing 200°, distance about 14 miles.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

23 January 1945 (Continued)

0800(K) Position: 10°-02.1' N.; 140°-24.6' E.

0848 Commenced tactical exercises.

0935 Ceased tactical exercises.

1042 Commenced antiaircraft firing on sleeves. Tow planes from ULITHI.

1100 Ceased firing; ceased present exercises. Sighted TG 51.1 approaching MUGAT Channel from the south.

1100 Executed Entrance Order No. A104-45.

1159 ESTES passed Beacon "A", MAGEJANG Island abeam to port. Entering ULITHI Lagoon.

1223 ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral KILAND, ComPhibGrp 7 in PRAIRIE. TF 52 ships present ULITHI: OLIVER MITCHELL, MAKIN ISLAND, LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, BAGLEY, HELM, O'FLAHERTY, R.M. ROWELL, MANILA BAY, RALPH TALBOT, R.S. BULL, SAGINAW BAY, PATTERSON, J. BUTLER, EDMUNDS, BLESSMAN, WAKE ISLAND, BULL.

TF 54 ship present: EVANS.

Arrivals, 23 January: TF 51: ComTransRon 11 in FREMONT, with KNOX, O'HARA, LEEDSTOWN, HARRY LEE, CALLAWAY, FELAND, PAYETTE, FUNSTON, PRES. JACKSON, BOLIVAR, DOYEN, PRES. ADAMS, CAPE JOHNSON, ALMAACK, WARRICK, LIBRA, HERCULES, JUPITER, SWEARER, RIDDLE. TF 52: CTF 52 in ESTES, with GILMER, WATERS, BATES, BARR. TF 54: NEVADA, TEXAS, WILLIMSON.

24 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

1030 Granted GILMER availability for repairs until 1800, 26 January.

1438 Granted WATERS availability at anchor until 1800, 27 January for repairs main steam line.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

24 January 1945 (Continued)

1438(K) Arrivals: TF 54: HALL, HALLIGAN, PAUL HAMILTON, TWIGGS.

25 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI.

0908 ComFIFTHFleet in INDIANAPOLIS arrived ULITHI.

1035 Requested ComTransRon 11 to assign 2 LCVP each temporarily to TEXAS and NEVADA.

1550 Granted WATERS 6 days tender availability to repair casualty to forced draft blower.

1711 Requested ComTransRon 11 to furnish 1 boat to PhibPac Secret Mail Officer.

2045 Requested AtComULITHI confirm approval UDT rehearsal on 3 and 6 February vicinity FAIS and LOSIEP Islands.

Departures: MANILA BAY.

26 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

1010 EVANS assigned temporarily to control of ComFIFTHFleet.

1659 CinCPac OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 declared fully effective 1400 26 January.

2138 Granted WILLIAMSON permission to exercise with tame submarine 27 January.

Arrivals: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD, TF 54: ComCruDiv 5 in CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, TUSCALOOSA, STEMBEL, BRYANT, BENNION, LEUTZE.

Departures: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

27 January 1945

0242(K) ComEsCarPacFor reported for duty with MAKIN ISLAND, LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, WAKE ISLAND, RALPH TALBOT, BAGLEY, HELM, R.S. BULL, R.M. ROWELL and O'FLAHERTY.

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral COOLEY, ComBatDiv 6 came aboard for conference on plans for bombardment of IWO JIMA.

0900 Fighter director exercises.

1136 DesDiv 101 less HARADEN ordered report CTF 54 for duty.

2013 Received report that Rear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, had reported aboard NEVADA.

2200 Fighter director communication drills.

Arrivals: TF 51: O'NEIL, STERN, S.S. MILES. TF 52: ComLCIFlot 3 in LCI(L) 627 and LCI(G)'s 450, 466, 471, 473, 469, 346, 474, 348, 438, 441, 449, 457, RUDYERD BAY, SARGENT BAY.

28 January 1945

0002(K) Received approval of AtComULITHI on UDT rehearsal area.

0900 Rear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, came aboard for conference on IWO JIMA plans.

1325 Requested repair services LCI(G) 466 gyro and electrical steering gear casualty; requested repair LCI(G) 627 fire and bilge pump.

1330 Commander Air Support Control Unit reported aboard INDIAN-APOLIS for conference General LeMAY regarding land-based bomber plans for IWO JIMA operation.

1400 Preliminary conference Force Gunnery Officer on ESTES with all Gunnery Officers of TF 54 ships present.

1525 Directed ComTransDiv 101 to furnish ComLCIFlot 3 with 2 boats daily for use of LCI Group 8.

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A-10

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28 January 1945 (Continued)

- 2015(K) Rear Admiral RODGERS (ComPhibGrpELEVEN) assumed command of TF 54.
- 2050 Ordered TEXAS, NEVADA and WILLIAMSON to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- Arrivals: TF 52: GRADY. TF 54: NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS, LEARY.

29 January 1945

- 0022(K) ComFIFTHFleet ordered DesDiv 111 to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
- 1028 ComFIFTHFleet directed BUSH report to CTG 51.1 for duty and BENNION, BRYANT and STEMBEL to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- 1330 Communication drill to test calibration transmitters and receivers for VOF spotting; TEXAS, NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA and ESTES. NOTE: These drills throughout used prepared traffic to resemble Hunter-Killer action. Frequencies tested 4340, 4720, 4580, 4450, 5015, 4795, 3845 and 3905.
- 1600 Secured from Communication drills.
- 1617 Advised ComFIFTHFleet that services EVANS could be spared if relief furnished prior departure SAIPAN.
- 1700 Assigned firing berth, ULITHI, as follows: TF 54 destroyers, Berth D; CTG 52.2, Berth E; CTF 54 for BB's and CA's, Berth F to 6 February; to CominPac, Berth F on 7, 8, 9 February.
- 1710 Directed substitution LEUTZE for EVANS in all plans for UDT support - Appendix V, Annex (H) CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44 and Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45.
- 1805 Assigned Hydrographic Observers, Lt.(jg) THOMPSON and Ens. MURPHY to CTG 52.2.
- Arrivals: Tf 52: ANZIO, L.C. TYALOR, R.F. KELLER.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

30 January 1945

0047(K) CTG 52.2 assigned PATTERSON, BAGLEY, O'FLAHERTY, ROWELL and R.S. BULL to screen for UDT rehearsal.

0735 Requested ComServRon 10 to drydock LCI(G) 450 to repack stern tubes, rudder post and propeller check.

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Communication drills; CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, ESTES.

1130 Secured from Communication drills.

1330 Communication drills, LEUTZE, BENNION and NEWCOMB.

1400 DesDiv Commanders reported aboard for preliminary conference.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

1817 Informed ComDesDivs 96, 101, 111 and 112 of desired ammunition loading of destroyers.

2015 Requested CTF 54 to direct BOYD report to CTG 51.1 for duty.

31 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Communication drills, H.L. EDWARDS, HALL, HALLIGAN.

0918 ComFIFTHFleet requested CTF 94 to advise status repairs DAVID W. TAYLOR.

1030 Requested CTG 51.1 to advise whether firing berth desired by that group.

1120 Directed CTG 52.4 to provide CAPPS, LEUTZE, J. D. HENLEY, TWIGGS, HALL and BRYANT each one SCR-610.

1130 Secured from communication drills.

1330 Communication drills, TWIGGS, STEMBEL, BRYANT.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

31 January 1945 (Continued)

1600(K) Secured from communication drills.

1 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. ComCruDiv 5 reported with CruDiv 5 to CTF 54 for duty.

1200 CTF 52 received orders from ComFIFTHFleet to coordinate sortie TF 51, TF 52 and TF 54 on 10 February.

Arrivals: TF 54: CAPPS, TAYLOR, HENLEY.

Departures: TF 52: ANZIO, L.C. TAYLOR, R.F. KELLER.

2 February 1945

0000(K) ComFIFTHFleet requested CinCPAC to authorize Rear Admiral RODGERS to command Task Force to which assigned regardless of relative rank other officers in same Force or Group. (This was approved).

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Conference in ESTES for UDT Rehearsals. Present: Com UDTsPac; CO's, UDT's 12, 13, 14, 15; ComTransDiv 101, CO's GILMER, WATERS, BATES, BARR, BULL, BLESSMAN; CO's HALL, D. W. TAYLOR, BRYANT, J. D. HENLEY, EVANS, CAPPS, TWIGGS; CO's Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2; CO's 10 LCI(G)'s.

1200 Requested ComFIFTHFleet authorize WAKE ISLAND and 2 screening vessels sortie 7 February for launching planes and conducting communication drill.

1410 Requested ComFIFTHFleet designate replacement destroyer for D.W. TAYLOR.

1419 Requested CTF 54 to designate destroyer to accompany Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2.

2042 DesDiv 111 reported to CTF 54 for duty.

3 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

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3 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0800(K) TG 52.11 commenced sortie for UDT rehearsals in PAU-LOSIEP Area in Accordance ComPhibGrpONE Rehearsal OpOrder No. A103-45 and ComUDTsPac Rehearsal OpOrder No. A2-45. ROGER-WILLIAM Hour 1100(K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500(K).
- 0900 Briefed photographic pilots aboard LUNGA POINT.
- 0930 Rear Admiral BLANDY attended CinCPac conference in INDIANAPOLIS.
- 1035 ComFIFTHFleet requested information on delivery air support charts for air and gunnery target folders. (Advised delivered to Officer Messenger Center, ULITHI, on 1 February for distribution).
- 1658 Port Director, ULITHI requested destination, SOA and route TU 52.5.1., TU 52.5.2, BAGLEY, PATTERSON, O'FLAHERTY, R.M. ROWELL, R.S. BULL. (Advised UDT rehearsal according to plan approved by AtComULITHI and copies supplied).
- 1835 ComFIFTHFleet directed all Task Force and Task Group Commanders to inform Port Director, ULITHI, of orders for sortie, entrance, etc., ULITHI.
- 1849 Requested CTG 51.1 issue orders OZARK, S.S. MILES and WESSON proceed GUAM, arriving 7 February.
- 2355 Requested ComServRon 10 to dock LCI(G)'s 450 and 489 for propellor repairs.

Arrivals: TF 52: CTG 52.3 in TERROR with LINDSEY.

4 February 1945

- 0200(K) ComFIFTHFleet directed STANLEY, HOWARTH and HALFORD report to CTG 52.3.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
- 0900 Critique in ESTES on UDT Rehearsal. Attendance same as conference 2 February.
- 0908 Directed order of sortie 10 February, TG 52.2 and 51.17 at 1300(K); TG 52.19 at 1430(K), ESTES first ship.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

4 February 1945 (Continued)

0930(K) Held conference on ESTES with CominPac and representatives on plans for IWO JIMA.

1300 Assumed radio guard ComPhibGrp7 who departed for IEXTE.

1330 Communication drills, PAUL HAMILTON, R.P. LEARY, J.D. HENLEY.

1430 Directed CTG 52.2 issue orders sortie WAKE ISLAND.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

1601 Advised ARKANSAS and IDAHO frequencies for aircraft radio drills 7 February.

1702 Advised ships TF 54 and TG 52.2 instructions for drill 7 February delivered to Officer Messenger Center.

1911 CTG 52.3 ordered RIDDLE report to OZARK for duty.

2328 ComFIFTHFleet ordered BREESE report CTG 52.3 for duty.

5 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. ComTransRon 11 advised no firing berths desired.

0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed all gunnery officers of ships of TF 54 present, CO's of TG 52.5 ships, VOF spotters from WAKE ISLAND and Marine Corps spotters with TF 54. Communication drills; INDIANAPOLIS, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON.

1130 Secured from communication drills.

1401 ComFIFTHFleet directed CTF 52 to address two weather reports daily to him and CTF 51 after commencement of bombardment.

1437 Requested ComServRon 10 release one SCR 608 to Cominpac.

Departures: TF 51: OZARK, WESSON, S.S. MILES, BELLEGROVE ASHLAND, RIDDLE.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

6 February 1945

- 0052(K) Advised ComFIFTHFleet that radio teletype to beach burned out.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. TG 52.11 commenced sortie for second UDT rehearsal PAU-LOSSIEP Area in accordance ComPhibGrpONE Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45 and ComUDTsPac Rehearsal Operation Order A2-45. Actual gunfire used. ROGER-WILLIAM Hour 1100(K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500(K).
- 1043 CTF 54 designated HENLEY to accompany LCI Group 8 on 9 February.
- 1328 CTG 51.1 requested permission proceed on duty assigned. Permission granted.
- Arrivals: TF 52: HOPKINS, DORSEY, HOGAN, HOWARD, BREESE.
- Departures: CTG 51.1 with ships assigned.

7 February 1945

- 0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. WAKE ISLAND, GRADY, R.E. BULL sortie to conduct communication exercises with spotting planes. Sent despatch to CTF 51 recommending LEUTZE and HAMILTON be substituted in UDT support in place EVANS and TAYLOR.
- 0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed gunnery officers of IDAHO and ARKANSAS on board ESTES. Held conference with ComUDTsPac on future operations during the morning.
- 0930 Communication drills with planes from WAKE ISLAND - Ships: TEXAS NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS, BRYANT, BENNION, STEMBEL, ESTES. The LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS, R.P. LEARY, HALL, ARKANSAS, HALLIGAN, TWIGGS, PAUL HAMILTON, J. D. HENLEY, IDAHO, NEW YORK and CAPPS listened only.
- 1022 CTG 52.3 directed HOGAN and LINDSEY to report for duty to Port Director, ULITHI as escorts.
- 1100 Secured from communication drills.
- 1200 ComUDTsPac reported Lt.Cdr. McLAUGHLIN, CO, BULL, admitted to SOLACE with diagnosis combat fatigue.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

7 February 1945 (Continued)

1330(K) Communication drills - same as morning.

1412 Requested CTU 94.10.1 to provide aircraft towing services TF 52 and 54 departing 10 February.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

1700 Issued orders to ComLCIFlot 3 to proceed on 7 February to SAIPAN - TG 52.16 assigned.

Arrivals: TF 54: ARKANSAS, IDAHO.

Departures: TF 51: LST 42, 121, 224, and HOGAN, LINDSEY.

8 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

0830 Conference in ESTES - Plans and briefing for IWO JIMA Operation. Attendance: CTF 54; CTG 52.2; CTG 52.3; CTG 52.4; Commanders Fire Support Units 1, 2, 3, and 4; Commanders Support Carrier Units 1, 2, and 3; ComDesDivs 11, 12, 91, 101, 111; ComCortDivs 63 and 72; Commanders Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2; Commanding Officers all ships present of TF 52 and TF 54. Also ComBatDiv 6, ComCruDivs 13 and 17 and Commanding Officers Fire Support Ships of TF 58.

1358 ComFIFTHFleet ordered PCE 851 to report to CTF 52 for movement to SAIPAN.

1430 CTG 52.3 in TERROR with GUNSTON HALL, DORSEY, HOWARD, HOPKINS ~~BREESE~~, HALFORD, PRINGLE, STANLEY and HOWARTH departed for SAIPAN.

1600 Requested ComFwdArea to assign 2 AO's to rendezvous with CTF 54 at 1700 12 February at Lat. 14°-58' N.; Long. 145°-34' E. and 2 AO's rendezvous CTG 52.2 at 0630 12 February Lat. 14°-33' N.; Long. 146°-00' E.

1615 Accepted offer ComCruDiv 5 for transfer of Aerologist to ESTES for forthcoming operation.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

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8 February 1945 (Continued)

1657(K) Ordered Lt. FERGUSON to assume temporary command of BULL, pending arrival new commanding officer.

2355 Directed PCE 851 to report to ComLCIFlot 3 for movement to SAIPAN.

Departures: TF 51: HALFORD, PRINGLE, STANLEY, HOWARTH.
TF 52: CTG 52.3 in TERROR with GUNSTON HALL, HOPKINS, DORSEY, HOWARD, and BREESE.

9 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. CTF 52 sent out speed-letter Serial 007, outlining antiaircraft firing for 10 February. TG 52.16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, HENLEY and PCE 851 departed for SAIPAN.

0900 During day briefed ships' spotters and plane spotters from BB's, CA's and CL's aboard ESTES.

1150 Requested CTG 52.2 to forward latest task organization his group.

1330 Communication drills, IDAHO, ARKANSAS, CAPPS.

1430 SALT LAKE CITY reported to CTF 54 for duty.

1437 Directed Movement Unit BAKER to remain 8 miles astern of Movement Unit ABLE upon completion AA firing 10 February.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

Departures: TG 52.16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, HENLEY and PCE 851 for SAIPAN.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

10 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. TF 58 commenced sortie.

0900 Continued briefing ships' spotters and plane spotters from BB's, CA's and CL's during morning aboard ESTES.

1200 Sent despatch to CTF 51 outlining plans for delivery operation orders to TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, NEW YORK, WILEY, HUTCHINS, TERRY and DALY. Also gave plans for briefing the above ships. Made radar guard assignments for TG 52.19.

1340 TG 52.19 commencing sortie. ESTES underway in accordance with Sortie Plan, Annex (A) to ComPhibGrpONE Movement Order No. A105-45.

1400 Directed screening vessels not to participate in firing against drone.

1415 Directed TUSCALOOSA to control drone runs for anti-aircraft firing. ESTES passed Beacon "A", MANGEJANG Island, abeam to starboard.

1533(K) CTG 52.19 assumed tactical command Movement Unit ABLE.

1602 Commenced scheduled exercises. Drone anti-aircraft firing.

1623 Received report NEWCOMB had gyro compass casualty, would join later.

1659 Informed CTG 52.9.2 that no drone available for him, as this group shot it down.

1700 Ceased drone anti-aircraft firing. Commenced anti-aircraft firing at towed sleeve.

1800 Ceased anti-aircraft firing.

1809 HELM delivered mail to ESTES.

1810 Formed cruising disposition 6Sl. Informed CTG 52.2 and CTG 52.9.1 of cruising orders for night.

2000 Position: 10°-38.9' N.; 140°-38.9' E.

2010 Informed by BATES that sound gear inoperative.

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11 February 1945

0738(K) CHESTER reported steering casualty.

0739 CHESTER reported steering casualty repaired.

0800 Position: 12°-00.2' N.; 142°-53.3' E.

0806 Ordered Movement Unit BAKER to join formation.

0904 Formed cruising disposition 3V1.

0949 Commenced tactical exercises.

1023 Secured from tactical exercises.

1200 Noon Position: 12°-27.5' N.; 143°-29.5' E.

1252 Approved CTG 52.2 proposal to send two TEM's to SAIPAN.

1611 Directed Movement Unit BAKER take station 16080 at 1645(K).

1645 Movement Unit BAKER leaving disposition.

1709 Formed cruising disposition 6S1.

1812 WATERS requested 12 hours availability SAIPAN repair steam leak main feed pump.

1818 Informed CTU 54.1.3 that ESTES will follow Fire Support Unit 3 during approach in morning.

1827 Directed CTU 54.9.13 to direct APD's of Movement Unit ABLE to proceed on duty assigned at 0500.

1830 Executed Primary Approach Plan, SAIPAN, Annex (B) to ComPhibGrp-ONE Movement Order A105-45.

2000 Position: 13°-50.7' N.; 144°-24.6' E.

2212 STEMBEL reported surface contact dead ahead, 3000 yards.

2217 Emergency turn 6 executed.

2231 Emergency 6 turn. Surface contact identified as PC 1339.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

12 February 1945

0500 APD's released to proceed as directed by CTG 52.4 to report to CTF 53.

0553 Fire Support Units 2 and 3 ordered to proceed independently.

0600 Fire Support Units 1 and 4 ordered to proceed independently.

0710 Received information from CTF 51 that AUBURN, ELDORADO, TG 53.5, TG 52.4, TF 54 only would engage in first rehearsal.

0735 CTF 51 ordered MULLANY to replace D.W. TAYLOR.

0815 Requested berth assignment at SAIPAN, for ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG.

0855 Requested 12 hours availability and berth for WATERS from CTF 51.

0930 CTF 51 took control air support and naval gunfire.

0931 ComDesRon 24 in DALY with HUTCHINS reported for duty. Ordered to report to CTG 52.2.

0937 Informed that BLESSMAN required new sonar projector head (none available).

0945 Transferred Lt.Col. WELLER and assistants to NEW YORK to brief for forthcoming operations.

1036 Second H Hour announced for 1230(K).

1040 WATERS availability granted.

1145 TENNESSEE requested permission remain anchor Berth L-40.

1150(K) CTF 51 directed primary plan for rehearsal 13 February.

1155 Directed CTF 54 to send one screening vessel each from Movement Group ABLE and BAKER to ESTES to receive mail at 1500.

1505 Requested ComServRon 10 to provide sonar projector head to BLESSMAN. (None available).

1605 CTF 51 directed CTF 53 to control gunfire and air support 13 February until H plus 30 when CTF 52 would assume control.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

12 February 1945 (continued)

- 1611 ESTES anchored Berth L-56 SAIPAN.
- 1637 Directed CTG 52.3 to send one minesweeper to close ESTES at 1800.
- 1801 CTF 51 directed CTG 52.3 to substitute YMS 426 vice YMS 411 and YMS 288 vice SC 775.
- 2123 Granted authority TENNESSEE remain at anchor until 0600 14 February.

13 February 1945

- 0620(K) ESTES underway independently enroute rehearsal area off TINIAN.
- 0651 TENNESSEE reported completing fueling.
- 0737 Transferred officer messenger mail to TWIGGS.
- 0756 CTF 53 confirmed H Hour at 0915.
- 0805 Requested CTF 54 issue movement orders to NEW YORK.
- 0952 Directed CTG 52.2 and CTU 52.5.1 to report logistic status vessels their groups.
- 1012 Directed ComLCTF 3 to report to CTG 52.3 with LCI Group 8 for movement when released by CTF 53.
- 1115 Received report LCI(G) 346 was holed by LVT and in harbor for repairs.
- 1237 MULLANY designated to replace D.W. TAYLOR night harassment D-3 night.
- 1239 Requested CTF 51 replace R.M. ROWELL due to casualty sound gear.
- 1240 CTF 53 signalled exercises completed.
- 1250 CTF 54 directed WILEY and BENNION to accompany NEW YORK to IWO JIMA.
- 1338 CTF 51 directed WESSON replace R.E. ROWELL in TG 52.2.

13 February 1945 (continued)

- 1522(K) Directed ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG to get underway in order named at 0610(K) 14 February.
- 1531 ESTES anchored in Berth L-56, SAIPAN.
- 1640 Ordered TENNESSEE and VICKSBURG to send gunnery officers and others to ESTES for briefing.
- 1935 Informed CTF 51 that logistics were completed.

14 February 1945

- 0612(K) CTF 51 directed that accurate records be kept for submission of all units Amphibious Support Force and Gunfire and Covering Force participating in forthcoming operation. (This was passed on to CTF 54 for information and action).
- 0612 ESTES underway standing out of harbor to rendezvous with TF 54.
- 0619 VICKSBURG and TENNESSEE underway; standing out.
- 0640 JOHN D. HENLEY, RICHARD P. LEARY and TWIGGS reported as screen.
- 0645 Formed column, ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, distance 850 yards.
- 0800 Position: 15°-15' N.; 145°-22' E.
- 0923 CTF 52 assumed tactical command TG 52.19. Formed cruising disposition 3V2.
- 1040 TENNESSEE reported all repairs to turbine completed.
- 1103 Directed screening vessels to include station number when reporting sound contacts.
- 1200 Noon Position: 15°-50.3' N.; 144°-42.4' E.
- 1300 HENLEY and BRYANT closed ESTES to receive mail and deliver to heavy ships.
- 1534 Directed CTG 52.4 to make deliveries charts accordance Annex (M), CTF 51 OpPlan 125-44, including Western beaches. Directed him to detail additional APD to accompany WATERS.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

14 February 1945 (continued)

1621(K) PAUL HAMILTON reported No. 3 main feed pump casualty. Estimated completion repairs morning 16 February.

2000 Position: 17°-28.6' N.; 143°-51.2' E.

15 February 1945

0800(K) Position: 20°-03.8' N.; 142°-43.3' E.

1020 Requested CTG 52.2 make fighter sweeps CHICHI JIMA on afternoon of D-3 and D-2 and morning and afternoon of D-1.

1100 CTG 52.2 reported that destroyer was sent to pick up high voltage transformer.

1200 Noon Position: 20°-55.3' N.; 142°-34.2' E.
Informed CTU 54.9.1 that after Movement Unit BAKER proceeded as previously directed he would become OTC of Movement Unit ABLE.

1252 Passed ComPhibsPac serial 0073 dated 11 February to CTG 52.4 for information and action.

1510 LEARY reported sound contact, distance 1500 yards; bearing 010°.

1517 LEARY reported contact probably fish (but much later after all ships had cleared vicinity, reported it as probable submarine).

1519 Emergency turn 9 executed.

1524 Increased speed to 15 knots.

1530 Emergency 6 turn executed.

1552 3 Turn executed bringing disposition back to original base course.

1710 Directed CTG 52.4 to limit speed of APD's to 20 knots and not to approach closer than 3000 yards to beach nor interfere with bombardment of IWO JIMA, during D-3 inspection of beaches.

1750 Directed Movement Unit BAKER to proceed independently.

1759 Movement Unit ABLE formed cruising disposition 6S3. Rear Admiral FISCHLER in TEXAS OTC.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

15 February 1945 (continued)

1800(K) Received visual from LEARY reporting only 4 echoes obtained on sound contact slight up doppler, no hydrophone effect. (Despatch sent to CTU 52.3.19 and TFC5thFlt informing them of contact).

2000 Position: 22°-21.5' N.; 142°-00.5' E.

16 February 1945

- 0000(K) Advance Movement Group approaching IWO JIMA in two dispositions, proceeding independently. Steaming on base course 331° at 14.5 knots CTF 52 in ESTES.
- 0230 TERRY detached to rendezvous with Minesweeping Unit 4.
- 0233 Contact made with Mine Unit 1, bearing 359°, range 36,900 yards.
- 0345 Contact made on MINAMI IWO JIMA, bearing 050°, range about 54,200 yards.
- 0452 Contact made with NEW YORK, bearing 081°, range 26,300 yards.
- 0625 SALT LAKE CITY launched spotting plane.
- 0630 BREESE directed to join Sweep Unit 4.
- 0643 Special fighter sweep on way to CHICHI JIMA to neutralize airfield and shipping.
- 0644 CTG 52.3 informed CTF 52 that Sweep Unit 1 was in Area 1 and Sweep Unit 3 in Area 13.
- 0700 STEMBEL detached to rendezvous with Minesweeping Unit 2.
- 0707 NEVADA commenced scheduled fires.
- 0714 Hydrographic plane on station.
- 0718 All fire support ships directed to fire at long and medium ranges only when efficient air spot is practicable.
- 0725 Air Coordinator and Strike Group ABLE on station.
- 0755 NEW YORK commenced scheduled fires.
- 0755 WILLIAMSON standing by NEW YORK #2 plane.
- 0757 2 Enemy merchant ships reported by an ASP plane 31 miles west of ~~Hatbrooke,~~
- 0758 SALT LAKE CITY directed to pick up downed plane.
- 0802 Informed that both Sweep Units 2 and 4 are 15 minutes behind schedule.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

0804(K) Merchant ships identified as of 500 tons or smaller.

0811 First pass completed in Area 1; results negative.

0815 Two enemy vessels under air attack.

0825 Air Support informed that 1 vessel was dead in water and that attack was continuing.

0830 WILLIAMSON recovered pilot and radioman from NEW YORK plane, which was beyond salvage.

0835 Strike Group ABLE ordered to return to base.
Hydrographic plane ordered to return to base; message drop cancelled.

0837 SALT LAKE CITY made report on status of NEW YORK plane.

0838 WILLIAMSON instructed to return personnel of downed plane to NEW YORK.

0840 SALT LAKE CITY returning to station.

0840 Strike Group BAKER orbiting base.

0843 Attack on two enemy vessels completed, both targets burning.

0850 All ammunition from 4 VF planes expended on two enemy vessels. 8 to 10 men were observed abandoning ship, getting into whale boat.

0853 TWIGGS requested instructions on what to do about survivors of sunken ships.

0856 All ships warned of floating mine sighted bearing 122°, distance 10 miles from Hebecks.

0857 Special CHICHI JIMA strike unable to accomplish mission due to weather.

0902 8 VOF on station.

0905 Fire support ships reported inside sweeping track in Area 1.

0908 Twin engined plane reported taking off island.

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A-27

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

0909(K) Flash RED; Control GREEN.

0913 Second lap of Area 1 completed; results negative.

0915 Screen Commander instructed to order ships to capture any boat from burning vessels and prevent their landing on IWO JIMA.

0917 Sweep Unit 3 in Area 13 and Unit 4 in Area 5 reported 30 minutes behind schedule. Unit 2 in Area 2 reported 20 minutes behind schedule. Results negative in all areas.

0927 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.

0930 CHESTER, PENSACOLA, VICKSBURG each report 2 operational aircraft.

0936 Flash RED; Control GREEN.

0940 Firing ships were asked if they were using air spot and all replied in the affirmative.

0953 NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY each reported 2 planes operational.

1008 Swoop Unit 4 under fire from beach in Area 5.

1009 Because of weather, photo plane did not take photographs.

1013 PC 800 reported sinking 1 Type 93 Model 3 floater mine at 0930.

1027 CHESTER firing to cover sweepers.

1041 All ships directed not to fire faster than scheduled rates. They were informed it was not necessary to maintain scheduled rates under unfavorable weather conditions.

1050 Sweep Unit 3 completed Area 2 on schedule; results negative.

1055 WILEY in Station A-17 made a sound contact and attacked. Contact lost, and unable to be regained.

1056 CominPac reported shoal, bearing 203°, distance 5 miles from ~~Hutchins~~ had been clearance swept; results negative.

1118 Area 2 completed on schedule.

16 February 1945 (continued)

1125(K) Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

1126 WILEY regained contact; not submarine. Did not make attack.

1140 CTG 52.3 was directed not to permit Unit 4 closer to beach until visibility permitted proper fire support.

1142 CTF 52 informed ships that at night while remaining at objective ESTES would keep NX12 beacon turned on pulsating. Other ships similarly equipped were authorized to use same method as aid in local identification.

1145 WILEY contact evaluated non-submarine.

1210 Area 1 completed, results negative.

1215 CAP strafing enemy whale boat.

1230 Sweep Unit 4 ordered to complete Area 5.

1240 CTG 52.3 requested to order Sweep Unit 1 to report to Commander Screen.

1240 UDT operations scheduled for night of 16-17 February cancelled. (Landing few men to investigate oil drums spaced along beach.)

1242 36 friendly heavy bombers approaching objective.

1243 All APD's less BAR assigned to CTF 54 for night deployment. CTF 54 requested to fuel them as practicable, WATERS first.

1245 Area 4 completed; results negative.

1301 Commander Screen directed to form Screen AB when Sweep Unit 1 reports for duty and to release APD's to CTG 52.4.

1320 TRACY investigated and recovered object reported as mine by ESTES. Object proved to be gun breach cover.

1323 36 heavy bombers orbiting waiting for break in weather.

1345 CAP returns to base.

1350 Sweep Unit 3 will complete northern half Area 13; available for screen at 1500.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

1355(K) CTF 54 informed fire support units to commence fueling APD's at 1600.

1400 3 APD's relieved by ships of TU 52.3.1; others to relieve in 15 minutes.

1401 BARR to be in position at 1500 for inspection of beaches.

1402 Sweep Unit 3 directed to report to Commander Screen upon completion of northern half of Area 13.

1410 Weather report sent to CTF 51.

1413 NEVADA to fuel BULL and IDAHO to fuel BLESSMAN beginning at 1600.

1415 OS2U plane from PENSACOLA shot down one Zeke.

1421 CAS reported bogie 7 ~~M-106's~~ 100.

1425 Flash RED; Control YELLOW.

1430 PENSACOLA directed to fuel WATERS and GILMER.

1437 Screen AB formed.

1445 CTG 52.3 reported fuel conditions to TG 52.3 satisfactory, except HOWARD, which will be fueled from TERROR on 17th.

1447 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW.

1453 CTG 52.4 instructed to commence inspection of beaches.

1512 Sweep Unit 1 completed Area 3 between 300 and 500 fathom curve; results negative.

1512 CAP launched.

1515 Sweep Unit 3 has completed northern half Area 13; results negative.

1517 SALT LAKE CITY reported small boat moving south in Area 149.

1520 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

1521 Area 5 to be completed at 1630; Area 6 at 1645.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

1530(K) SERENE, SHELTER, HALL reporting to Commander Screen for duty.

1533 CAP on station.

1534 CTU 52.3 directed to sink small boat moving south.

1544 CTU 52.3.5 reported he could see no small boat.

1605 CTU 52.3.5 requested to direct BREESE to sink buoys at Pts. J-M and K while gear was being recovered.

1613 TERRY reported mission completed.

1622 All ships which could effectively fire in assigned areas were directed to carry out fire without regard to time schedule, but to keep within ammunition allowance.

1628 Area 5 completed. Area east and west of HIGASHI Rock for 1000 yards not swept.

1631 LEARY reported sound contact; investigating.

1635 PENSACOLA directed not to fire on small boat which she reported as minesweepers were in this area.

1636 LEARY reported she had lost sound contact.

1640 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogies on radar screen).

1642 LEARY continuing to regain contact.

1643 Night deployment assignments made. Sweep Unit 4 to report to ESTES at 1800 for screening duties.

1644 MULLANY, HAMILTON, STEMBEL, and LEARY directed to remain at objective for night operations.

1645 BLESSMAN and BULL directed to report to CTF 54 on completion exercises.

1647 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogies proved friendly)

1652 BATES reported to CTF 54 for duty; exercise completed.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 1705(K) CTF 52 informed ships present that antiaircraft fire control would be governed by provisions of Appendix XIII, Annex (I) CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44.
- 1708 TU 52.3.1 ordered to proceed to Area 14 at 1800.
- 1712 CTG 52.3 reported that day's assigned sweep areas had been completed with negative results, except for one rusty Mark 93 Model 3 mine, which had been sunk by gunfire.
- 1716 ARKANSAS reported she was being fired on.
- 1720 TU 52.3.5 reported to CTF 52 for duty.
- 1720 VF crashed 3 miles from ~~Hobbs~~, bearing 300°.
- 1727 MULLANY directed to rescue pilot of downed plane.
- 1728 ARKANSAS estimated that 3" guns had fired at her.
- 1735 HOPKINS reported having rescued downed pilot from LUNGA POINT.
- 1740 Target ASP ordered to return to base.
- 1753 Ships ceased firing.
- 1800 ESTES, proceeding astern of TENNESSEE, underway. Minesweepers astern of ESTES.
- 1800 HOPKINS reported that rescued pilot was named STEVENSON.
- 1805 BARR reported her mission successfully completed.
- 1817 DEFENSE fouled sweeps on underwater object bearing 212°, distance 6100 yards from ~~Hobbs~~. CTG 52.3 suggested further investigation on 17th.
- 1821 CTF 52 informed CTU 54.1.3 that he and Sweep Unit 4 would follow group for a short time and then return to objective.
- 1832 MULLANY reported mission successfully completed.
- 1933 SCURRY retrieving gear by hand; will take another hour to complete. CTG 52.3 suggested joining ESTES group.

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

2000(K) Position: 24°-58.7' N.; 141°-05.5' E.

2045 SCURRY reported to screen of ESTES for assignment. She was assigned position 330, 2000 yards. ESTES course 118°, speed 8 knots.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945

0000(K) TF's 52 and 54 engaged in night deployment, after bombarding, minesweeping and air operations at IWO JIMA on D -3 Day. ESTES in company with four minecraft at 8 knots, circling IWO JIMA at 5 to 8 miles distance to maintain general observation of DD night operations.

0040 Bombardment instructions for 17th sent out to TG 54.1.

0100 Report of minesweeping accomplished sent out to TF 52 and TF 54.

0124 NEWCOMB and HALLIGAN directed to proceed to Lat. 26° N.; Long. 141° -50' E. at 0600 to operate as radar pickets and perform Air-Sea Rescue Services for TG 52.2 planes striking CHICHI and HANA JIMAS.

0243 ARDENT reported sound contact bearing 320°, distance 1500 yards.

0245 ARDENT reported she was going to attack, unless ordered otherwise.

0257 ARDENT reported contact lost in wake of other vessels.

0420 CTU 52.3.2 directed to leave formation and proceed and rendezvous with Sweep Units 6, 7 and 8.

0548 TEXAS, ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to launch planes at discretion.

0635 Carriers launched CAP.

0635 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

0640 SALT LAKE CITY launched planes.

0641 HALLIGAN reported under attack by 3 Betty's, bearing 355°, distance 48000 from ~~Ketbrocks~~.

0643 HALLIGAN downed one Betty, and received no damages.

0645 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.

0648 CAP on station.

0650 HALLIGAN reports screen cleared; planes last seen bearing 260°.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

0656(K) Flash RED; Control GREEN.

0700 Ships commence bombardment.
Flash RED; Control YELLOW.
CTG 52.4 asked for his recommendation for R-E Hour.

0707 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.

0708 CTG 52.4 recommends 1100 as R-E Hour.

0715 Strike ABLE on station.

0720 Mine Unit 2 and Gunboat Support Units One and Two arrived IWO JIMA.

0725 Special strike 12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA.

0730 CHESTER and PENSACOLA report 2 operational aircraft; VICKSBURG reports 0.

0734 CTU 52.3.5 released from screening ESTES; to carry out day's assignment.

0735 Target ASP on station.

0735 CTG 52.3 requested to direct 2 ships in addition to 4 AM's required from Sweep Unit 2 to report to ComDesRon 46 for duty.

0750 Informed that TRACY and LINDSEY had already been ordered to report for screening assignment.

0752 Informed all APD's except BARR and BATES fueled to capacity on 16th.

0758 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8 receiving considerable fire from GREEN Beach.

0800 Sweep Units 6 and 7 commencing scheduled operations in Area 9.

0801 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8 ordered to move to seaward.

0803 SALT LAKE CITY, NEW YORK, IDAHO, TENNESSEE and CHESTER directed to move into lower limit of Range Band BAKER.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

0810(K) Hydrographic plane over IWO JIMA.

0811 CTG 52.3 directed to commence operations; fire support ships closing in.

0818 CTG 52.3 commences operations. Requests 2 destroyers for close support.

0821 R-E Hour confirmed as 1100(K).

0824 Informed by CTG 52.3 that YMS would require closer fire support.

0825 CTG 52.3 directed to conduct further investigation of object upon which DEFENSE fouled her gear on 16th.

0830 CTU 54.1.1 ordered to direct TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA to close for accurate destructive bombardment; also to move NEW YORK, CHESTER and SALT LAKE CITY in to effective range.

0831 Photo plane and fighter escort on station.

0834 CTG 52.3 resuming operation.

0837 CTU 54.1.1 told that TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA were to move inside 3000 yards and as near 2000 as practicable.

0840 Requested CTG 52.3 to advise completion time of Area 9.

0855 ESTES closed to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles from beach.

0855 CTF 54 directed NEW YORK with 2 DD's as screen deploy night of D -2 following Movement Unit ABLE and to have NEW YORK in firing position at 0600 daily.

0858 CTG 52.3 advised he expected to complete Area 9 about 1100.

0902 Photo plane commenced operations at 5000 feet over target.

0920 ComDesRon 46 directed to assign 2 of first destroyers arriving for UDT support to support Sweep Units 5 and 6 in Area 9.

0933 CTG 52.3 was informed that fire support was being provided by battleships and that when destroyers are available they will supplement.

0935 LCI(G)'s forming up preparatory to closing eastern beaches in support of scheduled UDT operations.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0938(K) PENSACOLA hit by fire from IWO JIMA.
- 0948 CTG 52.3 informed CTF 52 that YMS received heavy fire from IWO JIMA.
- 1009 CTG 52.4 was asked which APD had been detailed to accompany WATERS to rendezvous with Attack Force.
- 1010 BRYANT and LEUTZE sent to support TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8.
- 1010 Weather report sent to CTF 51.
- 1014 CTG 52.3 reports that battery which hit PENSACOLA will interfere with Sweep Unit 4 in Area 8. Additional close in fire support requested.
- 1015 CHICHI JIMA strike on way home; many small craft there destroyed.
- 1016 ComDesRon 46 requested that BRYANT and LEUTZE be released from supporting minesweepers to take station for UDT operation.
- 1018 CTG 52.3 informed that unless minesweeping was expedited the UDT reconnaissance would be delayed.
- 1021 LCI(G)'s moving toward beach supported by TWIGGS and CAPPS.
- 1035 MULLANY designated to deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT. Ensign STEVENSON, who had been downed on 16th, will be returned from HOPKINS via MULLANY to LUNGA POINT.
- 1037 CTG 52.3 reported Area 14 completed; results negative.
- 1038 APD's standing in toward beach with UDT teams, preparatory to launching LCP(R)'s.
- 1039 LEUTZE and BRYANT directed to support both minesweepers and UDT's.
- 1045 LCI(G)'s have taken station to support UDT operation and are firing into the beach. Enemy returning fire.
- 1048 APD Units take station to commence UDT operation.
- 1052 CTG 52.3 reports Area 9 completed; results negative.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

1053(K) TENNESSEE directed not to fire time fused shells over UDT boats.

1055 TENNESSEE reports being hit at 0848; 4 men injured, no damage to ship.

1055 VICKSBURG moving around to support sweepers in Area 8.

1100 ROGER EASY Hour.

1101 LCI(G) 449 has been hit.

1112 LCI 450 standing out of operating area; she is afire.

1113 Smoke being furnished by white phosphorous shells.

1117 CTG 52.4 requested air strike in Area 183 and 184, whence fire is believed coming.

1121 LEUTZE reports being hit; Captain injured, Executive Officer in command, minor material damage.

1125 Air strike being sent in to support UDT's

1130 CTG 52.4 was asked if operations were progressing satisfactorily and he replied that UDT's were receiving heavy fire from right flank.

1133 YMS 362 fouled sweep gear on shoal Lat. 1410-19' E.; 240-44' N.

1137 CTG 52.4 requested smokers. He was directed to use W.P. projectiles.

1141 CTG 52.4 requested increased rate of fire on all known targets, and this was ordered.

1145 LCI(G) 474 observed to be hit; listing heavily; believed to be sinking.

1151 LCI 474 reports that crew has abandoned ship; all aboard CAPPS.

1156 CTG 52.4 was requested to provide information on nature of opposition from beach itself.

1200 CTG 52.4 believed opposition was from mortar fire.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1204(K) CTG 52.4 requested smokers again.
- 1218 CTU 52.5.1 informed that CTF 52 would take 21 or more bed cases after UDT operation completed.
- 1224 CTU 52.5.1 was asked how many LCI's would be available for afternoon's operations and he replied that only one would be available.
- 1225 WILLIAMSON going alongside LCI 449 which is reported out of control and sinking.
- 1234 CTU 54.9.1 asked if he should hold up firing schedule or continue from south of bearing 070°.
- 1238 CTG 52.3 requested instructions for Sweep Units 6 and 7 which are ready to commence in Area 10 on schedule.
- 1241 CTG 52.4 was requested for his recommendation for use of smoke during afternoon's exercises and his recommendation for R-W Hour.
- 1241 CTG 52.3 requested permission for Sweep Unit 4 to remain in Area 8, estimated time of completion 1500.
- 1241 TENNESSEE reported she had 40 critical cases from LCI's aboard.
- 1242 LEUTZE reported that Commanding Officer required Xray and surgery and she was told to close ESTES to transfer casualties.
- 1245 WILLIAMSON reported her rescue party aboard LCI 449 and that TERROR was alongside and standing by. WILLIAMSON available to continue servicing planes.
- 1251 CTG 52.3 was requested to verify reported obstruction.
- 1254 CTG 52.4 desired smoke for afternoon's operations.
- 1254 CTG 52.3 reported LCI alongside with 60% casualties aboard.
- 1310 B-24's contacted on way to IWO JIMA.
- 1313 CTU 52.3.6 directed to commence scheduled operation. LINDSEY and GAMBLE underway to assist.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1314(K) TWIGGS requested NEW YORK to take casualties she had aboard from LCI's.
- 1315 CTU 52.3.6 reported to CTG 52.3 that fire support was negative at this time.
- 1316 PENSACOLA requested cancellation of her firing schedule for the afternoon while doctor operated on casualties.
- 1325 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that she had possible sound contact on port bow, range 800 yards.
- 1325 CTG 52.3 directed to continue sweeping Area 8. Heavy fire support units ordered to close beach. CTG 52.3 to commence operations as soon as they arrive.
- CTU 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 informed LCI(G)'s not required for afternoon's operation.
- 1327 CTG 52.3 directed to commence operation in Area 10 as soon as heavy ships are seen to close the beach.
- 1327 CTG 52.4 informed that no LCI's are available for afternoon's operation and that the use of airplane smoke screens, WP shells from destroyers and close support by both DD's and heavy ships is contemplated.
- 1330 CTG 52.4 reported on morning's operation: 12 LCI's hit; all swimmers but one recovered. He recommended that DD's close to 2000 yards and that smoke planes be available for immediate use, on call.
- 1333 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that contact was mushy; no contact now.
- 1337 VICKSBURG directed to cover minesweepers in Area 8 and to carry out schedule as far as possible.
- 1337 Sweep Unit 3 being fired on by 40mm. in Area 7. Ordered to move out until fire support arrives.
- 1339 Photo plane mission successfully accomplished.
- 1350 Smoke planes report on station.

ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1354(K) B-24's bombing IWO JIMA.
- 1358 LEUTZE reports damage sustained in morning's hit.
- 1400 CTU 54.9.1 directed to observe operations in Area 10 and inform CTF 52 if airplane smoke needed for their protection. Ships are to close in to 2000 yards from shore.
- 1400 HAMILTON and HENLEY designated to support YMS in Area 10, commencing now.
- 1402 MULLANY instructed to rendezvous at 0600 18th at Pt. RANSOM to deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT.
- 1406 ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to close in to within 2000 yards of shore.
- 1409 ComCruDiv 5 to take charge of CHESTER and VICKSBURG in supporting minesweepers in Area 7 and 8.
- 1410 HOPKINS directed to transfer Ens. STEVENSON to MULLANY for transfer to LUNGA POINT.
- 1415 Received report of damage to PENSACOLA.
- 1424 Informed that CTU 52.5.1 was putting a few officers and men aboard LCI 449.
- 1425 All ships requested to keep sharp lookout for one missing UDT swimmer.
- 1428 Commanding Officer of LEUTZE and 3 injured men transferred to ESTES.
- 1444 CTG 52.4 was informed that CTF 52 was still awaiting his recommendation for R-W Hour and designation of APD to accompany WATERS.
- 1448 CTG 52.4 was ordered to direct WATERS to close ESTES prior to leaving on assigned mission, to receive material for delivery to Tractor Group ABLE.
- 1455 CTF 54 requested 6 AM's for night deployment, as Movement Unit BAKER screen was reduced to four DD's.

ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1455(K) ESTES proceeding to west coast of IWO JIMA.
- 1458 CTG 52.4 recommended R-W Hour as 1615 provided all DD's are available. He could not designate an APD to return with WATERS until need for demolition determined.
- 1504 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 1507 Ordered CTF 54 to sink LCI(G) 474, which had capsized and was a menace to navigation. (Later informed by CTF 54 that LCI(G) 474 was sunk by 40mm. fire from CAPPS at 1329(K), 3½ miles, 091° from SURIBACHI in about 100 fathoms of water.)
- 1507 Issued following orders for UDT operation: 5" AAC and 5"/51 fire will be as follows: TENNESSEE move into Sector 3, cover southern flank; ARKANSAS cover Purple 1, Brown 1 and 2; TEXAS, White 1 and 2 and Orange 2. TUSCALOOSA Orange 1 and southern flank. Carry out fire on schedule relative R-W Hour.
- 1509 VICKSBURG asked CTU 52.3.4 if ships had been fired upon during last sweep.
- 1510 CTU 52.11.1 notified his task unit that R-W Hour was 1615 and that destroyers would close from 3000 to 2000 yards offshore as no LCI's are available.
- 1511 ASP plane damaged 4 luggers on KITA IO JIMA with rockets and machine gun fire.
- 1514 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogey identified as friendly.)
- 1514 Sweep Unit 4 moved out of Area 8 into Area 3. Area 8 75% completed from seaward.
- 1515 ARKANSAS requested permission to move out to about 3000 yards in order to fire over minesweepers with main battery. Permission was granted.
- 1517 CTU 52.3.4 reported to VICKSBURG that ships had been fired on from a battery in Area 251 FKLM.
- 1525 CTG 52.4 requested that HENLEY and HAMILTON be returned to support UDT's.

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

1528 LINDSEY requested PAUL HAMILTON to neutralize Area 146 LMN as sweepers drew fire from that area.

1553 CTG 52.3 directed to designate one AM to take LCI 441 in tow.

1554 CTG 52.4 requested smokers for line 233R to 198G.

1557 ComDesRon 46 ordered to direct HENLEY and HAMILTON take position for UDT support.

1559 CTG 52.4 made additional request for smoke; on line 147B to 131X.

1600 CTG 52.4 reported no obstacles and only one mine in morning's mission.

1602 CTU 52.5.1 requested ship be assigned to repair underwater damage in 3 LCI's to make them seaworthy.

1603 APD's launching UDT teams.

1605 CTG 52.3 submitted report on damage to LCI 449.

1605 Enemy returning fire of DD's supporting UDT operation.

1606 Western beaches being strafed in support of UDT operation.

1615 ROGER WILLIAM Hour.

1621 MULLANY directed to remain in screening station until released by ComDesRon 46 and then to close ESTES.

1624 Smoke being laid on western beaches in support of UDT operation. Not laid where ordered.

1650 CTG 52.4 requested smoke from planes and WP from destroyers on line between 233R and 198G.

1655 Minesweepers fired on from Area 233.

1710 Sent following message to CTU 52.5.1: "Greatly admire magnificent courage your valiant personnel. When circumstances permit report condition each LCI and casualties. LCI 474 which capsized has been sunk. Am directing one AM designated by CTG 52.3 to take LCI 441 now alongside NEVADA in tow and remain objective pending further orders."

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17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1712(K) Reported to CTF 94 that B-29 reported survivor 214 miles bearing 089° from IWO JIMA at 1300 17th. Sending search to drop survival kit first light 18th.
- 1715 CTG 52.3 reported on condition of LCI 469 and 457.
- 1720 CTF 54 directed to use every opportunity to fuel DD's from heavy ships.
- 1734 HOWARD reported picking up crew of TBF.
- 1738 Night deployment postponed until 1830.
- 1739 CTU 52.5.1 requested to close ESTES and come aboard for brief conference.
- 1742 CHAMPION reported picking up three men from PETROF BAY.
- 1800 MULLANY directed to remain vicinity of ESTES and assist in screening. Photographs will not be ready for transfer until 0300, 18th.
- 1800 Sweep Unit 4 directed to report to ESTES as screen; Sweep Unit 1 to report to CTF 54 for screening assignments.
- 1805 SALT LAKE CITY granted permission to join CTU 54.9.1.
- 1806 CTG 52.3 reported on day's sweeping assignments: All areas completed, except inboard 25% of Area 8; results negative.
- 1810 LCI 471 reported to ESTES for repairs.
- 1813 All aircraft of support group, ASP and one section CAP returned to base.
- 1815 CTG 52.4 directed to report type of mine found in first operation.
- 1817 UDT operations completed. Ships ordered to cease supporting fires.
- 1818 EDWARDS, TWIGGS, STEMBEL directed to remain objective for night operations.
- 1825 SALT LAKE CITY directed to proceed and recover disabled spotting plane, bearing 272°, 3 miles from beach.

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ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

1828(K) Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW.

1830 TU 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 directed to remain vicinity objective overnight.

1836 CTG 52.3 reported Area 3 completed; results negative.

1838 CTG 52.4 reported on mine found in morning's operation. No evidence of minefield; mine found in 8 feet of water.

1850 LCI 471 alongside ESTES for repairs.

1855 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)

1859 CTU 54.9.1 granted permission to proceed as previously directed upon completion of firing.

1910 CTG 52.3 directed to be prepared to clear side of TERROR for maneuvering, in view of bogey situation.

1920 CTG 52.4 considered no further UDT operations necessary.

1933 Received report on mincraft and LCI casualties..

1934 CAPFS directed to contact CTU 52.5.1 in morning in regard to transfer of LCI(G) personnel.

1938 Flash RED; Control YELLOW.

1945 LCI 471 away from alongside ESTES.

2000 Position Report: 24°-38.5' N.; 141°-26.6' E.

2020 Issued instructions to ships to keep bright lookout for hostile planes.

2030 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Radar screen clear.)

2034 CTU 52.3.5 directed to join ESTES group.

2100 CTG 52.4 to CTF 52: Transfer completed. Expect you will detach WATERS and BULL.

2112 WATERS and BULL sent on assigned mission.

ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 2135(K) CTF 54 dispatched casualty report his force.
- 2158 MULLANY directed to take charge of screen around ESTES.
- 2225 CTU 52.3.5 reported having three men aboard from PETROFF BAY and requested instructions as to disposition of them.
- 2231 WATERS and BULL proceeding on duty assigned.
- 2252 Dispatch sent to fire support ships assigning targets for 18th.
- 2317 MULLANY direct to proceed to rendezvous with LUNGA POINT at 0600 18th. Transfer photographs and Ens. STEVENSON and return to objective.
- 2340 CTU 52.3.5 told that orders would be issued in morning regarding transfer of PETROFF BAY personnel.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

0000(K) TF 52 and TF 54 operating in accordance with CTF 52 Operation Plan No. A101-45 in vicinity of IWO JIMA.

0058 CTG 52.2 was ordered to direct LUNGA POINT to comply with CTF 51 OpPlan 25-44 in delivering photographs to be received from MULLANY.

0308 MULLANY was directed to close ESTES.

0351 MULLANY was directed to proceed on duty assigned having received from ESTES photographs and aviator for delivery to LUNGA POINT.

0625 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)

0635 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey identified as friendly.)

0645 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

0650 CAP on station.

0656 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)

0658 Special air strike by 12 VF underway for CHICHI JIMA.

0659 Air coordinator on station.

0700 Fire Support Ships commenced firing.

0705 TRACY and TU 52.3.5 directed to report to CTG 52.3

0715 PENSACOLA reported she had jettisoned damaged plane and had made temporary repairs on shell holes underwater forward.

0716 Flash RED; Control GREEN

0717 ASP now on station.

0720 Air Support Group of 8 VF and 8 VT on station.

0725 CTG 52.3 was directed to suspend sweeping operations in Areas 7, 8 and 10 until further instructions were received; to continue in Area 13.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

0739(K) CTU 52.3.6 was asked by CTF 52 if he observed nature of drums on beaches during sweeping operations yesterday.

0743 Special strike on CHICHI JIMA cancelled due to weather.

0747 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.

0758 CTG 52.3 was directed to further investigate underwater obstruction reported bearing 212° distance 6100 yards from SURIBACHI.

0806 PENSACOLA reported she would cease fire as her scheduled fire for period was completed, and she had surgical work to do on casualties. Permission granted.

0808 Flash WHITE; Control Green. (No unidentified planes on radar screen.)

0815 CTF 54 recommended LEUTZE screen NEW YORK enroute SAIPAN and be granted availability at SAIPAN for repairs.

0820 CTU 52.3.6 advised CTF 52 he had been unable to identify drums on beaches.

0841 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)

0855 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

0856 Air Coordinator reports sighting bogey, believed to be an Irving.

0903 Directed CTF 54 to supply information on present fuel situation of DD's.

0905 PC 800 reported definite sound contact, bearing 145°, distance 8 miles from SURIBACHI.

0904 CTF 54 directed major ships to rig to fuel one DD each and to accomplish fueling when this could be done without interfering with scheduled bombardment.

0914 Directed CTG 52.4 to supply information on present fuel situation of APD's.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIM CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 0921(K) Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.
- 0923 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 0928 PC 800 reported having lost contact which was evaluated as non-sub. CAPPS investigated area without obtaining contact and resumed station.
- 0950 BREESE reported sound contact in Patrol Area C6 and now attacking.
- 0958 CTU 52.3.6 stated no drums observed on eastern beaches.
- 1007 BREESE completed second attack in Area C6 and sighted unidentified slick.
- 1015 CTF 52.3 ordered PC 800 to investigate possible shoal reported as bearing 212°, distance 6100 yards from SURI-BACHI.
- 1027 ComDesRon 46 was asked if he had double screen stationed.
- 1029 ComDesRon 46 was asked to make recommendations when Hunter-Killer operations deemed advisable.
- 1029 LCI 471 was asked if she required assistance to insure seaworthiness.
- 1031 NEW YORK reported she was unable to deliver more than 27000 gallons of fuel an hour as she was not equipped with modern pumps.
- 1035 GILMER was ordered to proceed to ESTES for fuel; WILLIAMSON, BATES and BARR to follow.
- 1051 MULLANY reported that in passing photographs to LUNGA POINT, supporting lines slacked, dropping containers into sea. All were recovered and delivered, believed in good condition.
- 1056 CTU 52.3.6 reported that mounds resembling little volcanoes were observed on eastern beaches and fired upon with no apparent damage to them.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1058(K) TWIGGS reported that plane that attacked her may have used leaky NAN beacon X-12 as point of aim. Her beacon had been satisfactory until yesterday and was found after attack to be damaged from own gunfire during day.
- 1100 ComDesRon 46 reported double screen in effect.
- 1100 CTF 54 reported all DD's have about 60% fuel aboard.
- 1109 STRENGTH proceeding to investigate a sound contact reported by DEFENSE.
- 1121 CTG 52.4 reported swimmers within ten yards of waterline on all beaches except ORANGE, 25 to 60 yards; PURPLE, 50 yards; BLUE, 30 to 80 yards.
- 1124 ComDesRon 46 was directed to supply information on status of BREESE sound contact.
- 1125 IDAHO and TENNESSEE were informed their mission not completed until direct hits obtained on all casemated guns located at northern base of SURIBACHI and on north flank of eastern beaches.
- 1125 CTG 52.3 was directed to prepare to execute D -1 minesweeping schedule in Area 7 and 8, including remainder of Area 8 uncompleted yesterday; no further work contemplated at present in Areas 9 and 10. Directed to retire immediately if heavy fire received.
- 1125 CTU 54.1.3 was directed to recommend support for sweeping assignments in Areas 7 and 8.
- 1128 ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE lost sound contact at 1036; operation "observant" being carried out.
- 1130 HALL reported #3 main feed pump casualty; to be repaired midnight tonight.
- 1131 LEUTZE was directed to report to NEW YORK prior 1800 for screening duty. To obtain emergency repairs at SAIPAN and return IWO JIMA.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1150(K) Commander Screen was directed to reassign units for covering screening stations C 18 to C 20.
- 1151 CTU 94.11.1 was informed that 2 VT with survival kits had been sent to search for downed personnel reported by B-29's yesterday.
- 1205 STRENGTH reported sound contact worked by her and DEFENSE evaluated as non-sub.
- 1211 ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE and MULLANY completed operation "observant" without further contact. They are returning to screening stations.
- 1212 LCI 477 reported she was in no immediate danger, but could not proceed in rough sea above six knots without shipping water through above water holes in hull.
- 1223 CTU 52.5.1 was directed to make recommendations as to which LCI's should return to base, with reason therefor, so that Movement Orders might be issued.
- 1236 CHESTER reported plane in water bearing 115°, 5½ miles from Mount SURIBACHI.
- 1250 BISMARCK SEA reported hydrographic conditions at IWO JIMA to TF 51.
- 1315 TEXAS VOS picked up survivor bearing 090°, 135 miles from SURIBACHI and is bringing him back. (Survivor was located by VT's searching for survivor reported yesterday by B-29's.
- 1322 12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA for special strike.
- 1353 CTU 52.5.1 reported LCI's 441 and 473 require towing; 441 has inoperative machinery and 473 has engine room flooded. LCI's 438, 449, 457, 466 and 471 require extensive repairs to hull and armament; 450 and 469 can be operated after above water hull damage is repaired; 346, 348 and 627 operative.
- 1358 NEW YORK was directed to transfer Marine spotter to VICKSBURG prior departure.

A-11
UNCLASSIFIED

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

1401(K) TEXAS was ordered to cover minesweeping operations in Areas 7 and 8.

1405 LEUTZE reports TBF crashed at 1400, several hundred yards off northern tip of island.

1415 HALL and BRYANT were directed to rescue survivors in rubber raft bearing 0050, distance 3 to 4 miles from Mount SURIBACHI.

1415 Directed CTF 54 to submit his opinion as to whether defenses of IWO JIMA had been sufficiently reduced to justify scheduled operations on 19th.

1415 VICKSBURG reported HAMILTON was within one mile and was picking up survivors, from plane crash off north side of island.

1418 B-24 strike cancelled on account of weather.

1430 CTU 54.1.3 requested CTG 52.3 for special instructions for covering minesweeping. CTG 52.3 replied that operations will commence in Areas 7 and 8 as soon as fire support arrives; sweepers now ready.

1440 HALL and BRYANT were directed to report to CTG 52.3 to assist in covering minesweeping in Areas 7 and 8.

1440 CTG 52.3 was directed to proceed with operations in Areas 7 and 8.

1446 Sweep Unit 2 now in northwest corner Area 8; will sweep east.

1503 CTG 52.3 was informed that smoke planes would be on station during minesweeping operations. Informed him CTF 52 did not wish to use smoke unless enemy fire is heavy, as it would interfere with bombardment.

1506 LINDSEY was directed by CTG 52.3 to cover unit commencing sweep in Area 7.

1510 WILLIAMSON was directed to proceed to two Kingfishers out of gas bearing 1250, 5 miles from SURIBACHI.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

1510(K) BRYANT likewise covering unit sweeping Area 7.

1515 LEUTZE requested permission to close ESTES prior to reporting to NEW YORK to transfer effects of Commanding Officer. Permission granted.

1525 BATES was directed to come alongside ESTES for fuel.

1530 CTF 54 was informed by ComDesRon 46 that if destroyers did not fuel, they would require reballasting.

1554 PC 800 reported she had conducted investigation for reported shoal, with negative results.

1547 WILLIAMSON reported two spotting planes in water have gas; boat standing by to assist as necessary.

1600 BARR directed to repair light on HIGASHI Rock.

1600 Issued orders to LCI's to remain near objective tonight. Recommended to CTF 51 that LCI(G) 346 and 348 be used as Press boats; others not to take part in assault tomorrow.

1605 Ordered NEW YORK to use all 14" and as much 5"/51 HC as profitable; firing need not terminate at 1800.

1610 CTU 94.11.1 was informed that one survivor from a CVE in rubber boat was rescued in position 135 miles, bearing 090° from IWO JIMA at noon today. CTF 52 sent TEXAS a "Well done" for VOS pilot and crew who made this rescue.

1611 LINDSEY reported she would make next sweep with CTU 52.3.4.

1622 Ens. VALPEY of NATOMA BAY, survivor, brought aboard ESTES, condition good.

1630 Special strike on CHICHI JIMA returning to base.

1632 Sweep for moored mines in Area 8 completed; results negative.

1649 CTU 54.1.4 reported several large caliber shells falling in his vicinity.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1650(K) Sweeping of Area 8 inside 100 fathom ~~curve~~ completed for magnetic mines. Sweepers to make one pass in Area 7, unless otherwise directed. CTG 52.3 considers minesweeping to date sufficient until island is taken.
- 1658 LEUTZE directed to close ESTES prior to former's departure.
- 1700 Minesweeping in southern half Area 13 completed; results negative.
- 1708 IDAHO reported splashes in her vicinity; believed to be overs from other side of island.
- 1713 SALT LAKE CITY reported overs to be **ricochets**. Fragments from last hit SALT LAKE CITY, no damage to ship.
- 1714 Permission granted to LINDSEY to fire salvos at three anti-aircraft batteries she discovered.
- 1715 Issued orders to NEW YORK to depart IWO JIMA screened by LEUTZE at about 1830.
- 1718 TU 52.3.4 was directed to clear area and recover minesweeping gear.
- 1735 CTG 52.3 submitted fueling requirements of his group.
- 1743 LEUTZE reported to NEW YORK for screening duty.
- 1749 SALT LAKE CITY reported ammunition allowance for day expended.
- 1750 UDT 13 completed repairing light on HIGASHI Rock.
- 1752 Informed CTU 94.11.1 that survivor rescued at noon today was not the one reported by B-29's on 17th.
- 1800 BATES alongside ESTES to fuel.
- 1800 CTG 52.3 directed DM 18 and DM 15 report to CTF 54 for night deployment.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1812(K) CTG 52.3 reported sweeping 1500 yards inside 100 fathom curve completed in Area 7; results negative. Sweep Unit 3 recovering gear.
- 1815 TENNESSEE was granted permission to leave station to pick up damaged plane.
- 1817 CAP and ASP returned to base.
- 1822 CTU 54.9.2 requested CTG 52.3 to provide six escorts for night deployment.
- 1825 Orders for night deployment issued. Sweep Unit 4 to report to ESTES as screen.
- 1837 CTU 52.3.5 reported to ESTES for screening duty.
- 1848 TWIGGS was directed to screen ESTES until arrival of Sweep Unit 4.
- 1850 STEMBEL, TWIGGS, LEARY, HALL and HENLEY designated to remain at objective for night operations.
- 1852 Informed CTF 54 that Sweep Unit 1 and 4 APD's have been ordered to report to him for screening purposes during night deployment.
- 2000 BATES completed fueling from ESTES.
- 2002 ComDesDiv 101 in HALL was placed in charge of night operations and directed to ensure that enemy did not work on beaches during the night.
- 2030 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 2035 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Screen clear.)
- 2130 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52.4 that she had been hit and was on fire. (No details given.)
- 2135 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 2200 Flash WHITE; Control WHITE. (Screen clear.)

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 2223(K) CTF 54 reported GAMBLE hit by plane amidships. Two destroyers standing by.
- 2250 CTF 52 informed CTF 51 he believed landing could be accomplished on schedule.
- 2255 BLESSMAN requested CTG 52.4 to close and put water on boat deck fire.
- 2255 GAMBLE reported to CTG 52.3 via HAMILTON that she had been hit by bomb from low flying twin engine bomber. DORSEY standing by to take GAMBLE in tow.
- 2259 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52.4 she was losing control. (Presumably of fire.)
- 2303 CTU 52.5.2 reported shell fragments recovered from LCI 457 identified as about 6". He believed that spherical buoys moored offshore were used for mortar and artillery range purposes. Other fire encountered was 37mm and .30 cal.
- 2315 CTF 52 asked CTG 52.4 if he was in contact with BLESSMAN, and whether he needed assistance.
- 2334 CTG 52.4 replied he required medical assistance and a ship to take BLESSMAN in tow. Position: 19 miles, bearing 345° from SURIBACHI.
- 2340 CTU 52.5.1 reported his ships noted buoys offshore during UDT operation, presumably for ranging purposes by the enemy.
- 2346 CTU 52.3.5 was ordered to send an AM to take BLESSMAN in tow.
- 2356 CTF 52 informed CTG 52.4 that ARDENT was being sent to take BLESSMAN in tow, and directed CTG 52.4 to bring casualties to ESTES after ARDENT had taken BLESSMAN in tow.

19 February 1945

- 0205(K) CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that HAMILTON with GAMBLE in tow and ARDENT with BLESSMAN in tow were proceeding to a designated point near IWO JIMA where they arrive at dawn,

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

19 February 1945

- 0205(K) and that both GAMBLE and BLESSMAN had been damaged by bombing. Recommend that salvage ships be sent to them as soon as possible.
- 0519 Radar contact made with approaching main body of Joint Expeditionary Force.
- 0559 ComPhibGrpONE reported to CTF 51 for duty as CTG 51.19.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE

1. PLANNING

(a) Assembly of intelligence material for Staff planning began about 1 November. Photographs were of high order and other available target information reflected the work done by higher echelons particularly by JICPOA and ComPhibsPac Intelligence Section. Very close liaison was maintained with the latter, and Group ONE intelligence personnel participated in the design and production of much of the detailed intelligence material. Bombardment, navigation, anchorage, and other basic maps and charts were available well in advance.

(b) Group ONE designed (with the assistance from Air Pac) and supervised production of a new type air-target folder reported as highly satisfactory to air and air-ground liaison personnel. These consisted of gridded vertical contact prints (scale of 1/5,000) of each 1,000-yard square with a line intelligence map containing defense installations of the identical area facing each companion photo and printed on the reverse of the preceding sheet.

(c) A detailed photographic plan was prepared by the section as a result of conferences with representatives of FMFPac, 5th PhibCorps, PhibsPac, and PhibGrpTWO and was included as a part of the PhibsPac Air Plan. It was detailed as to coverage and distribution and provided for a final interpretation of late photographs to be made at GUAM by Interpron TWO and representatives of the units involved in the IWO JIMA Operation.

(d) In view of the limited time available for reduction of defenses, ComPhibGrpONE directed that the photographic interpretation section be increased, since accurate, rapid, and continuous damage assessment would be essential to accomplish the maximum results. Accordingly, arrangements were made for the temporary services of two photo interpreters, one from Fleet Marines Force, Pacific, and one from PhotoRon TWO at GUAM making a total of five photo interpreters attached to the Staff. Results accomplished, despite poor photographic weather, justified the increase.

(e) To further accurate damage assessment, the section set up and operated a target information center in Joint Operations, where ships' and planes' reports on naval gunfire and air missions were recorded on cards, previously set up for each primary target, and given

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a serial number to facilitate reports by firing ships. A Kardex system was installed so that information would be instantly available for use by the force Gunnery Section and CASCU personnel. As available, photo-intelligence of damage to installations was to be added and a final evaluation of results made.

(f) In view of the absence of ships to be assigned ComPhibGrpONE for the bombardment it was decided that distribution of PhibsPac intelligence material could best be made by ComPhibGrpONE at ULITHI. Accordingly, on leaving PEARL HARBOR, this material was taken aboard and subsequently distributed at the staging point.

(g) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Wherever possible, PhibsPac and Group Intelligence Sections should be together during the planning phase, at least until material to be produced is decided on and responsibility therefor assigned. Where separation is unavoidable it is recommended that reasonably frequent conferences by representatives be held.

(2) The accurate location of defensive installations on early maps is extremely important and more care should be taken in order that relocation of the same targets need not be made on later maps. Joint participation by naval and ground forces in the preparation of intelligence maps is most desirable.

2. STAGING

(a) Enroute to ULITHI, work was completed on special intelligence presentations for use by fire support ships. Sets of annotated enlargements of the east and west beaches, showing particularly the blockhouses, pill-boxes, and covered artillery emplacements located in this area, were produced in quantity. The obliques were tied in with the grid-maps by annotating prominent points on the former with pin-point grid coordinates. Silhouettes of the island from various angles and distances off-shore, and sets of stereo coverage of the target were also produced in sufficient quantity for distribution to the destroyers, battleships, and cruisers.

(b) Briefing consisted of meetings with intelligence officers attached to the larger ships, general briefing of ships gunnery officers, and a photographic briefing of ships' air and top spotters, during which photographs of areas of responsibility were studied. Sufficient time was not available to make this last program fully effective, but some value was derived. Much more can be done in this re-

UNCLASSIFIED

gard by breaking the sessions up into smaller units.

(c) Together with the air-support intelligence officer, personnel aboard the carrier designated to take most of the D -3 to D Day photographs were briefed, and a photographer from ComPhibsPac put aboard to assist in the photographic program. Results are covered in detail in the CASCU comments (Enclosure (D), herein).

(d) Considering the number of changes in the makeup of TF 54 and TF 52, distribution of intelligence material was accomplished satisfactorily. The fact that this material was aboard the flagship undoubtedly was responsible, as addressees of packages made up in advance could be changed to meet a very fluid situation. CTF 52 also had on hand a supply of spare copies of such material and was thus able to take care of new-comers on the spot. The officer detailed from the staff of ComPhibsPac was very helpful in meeting a difficult distribution situation.

(e) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) So far as the gunfire and covering force is concerned, every effort should be made to produce special intelligence which will be of aid on the firing program. To accomplish this, fire support ships should make suggestions and submit any ideas regarding material which would be useful as well as indicating those things which are of no particular use to them.

(2) It is recommended that future photographic plans have in mind fire support requirements, and photographs be obtained which will, so far as possible, enable firing ships to thoroughly know their areas of responsibility.

(3) Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers should be equipped with several pairs of stereo viewers. At present most of these ships have none on board.

(4) Intelligence officers aboard fire support ships should become "field fortification experts" and should be in a position to thoroughly brief personnel aboard; and should, where possible, maintain very close liaison with the Intelligence Section of Commander Amphibious Support Force.

(5) Photographic plane should carry a hand camera of sufficient focal length to take large scale photographs, in the event a camera of small focal length is installed to meet special conditions which may fail to materialize.

(6) If ships assigned to the support force are scattered when the principal distribution is to be made, it is recommended that material be packaged by type, and distribution accomplished by Commander Support Force at the staging area; providing of course, sufficient time for study still exists. In any event, a supply of 150 copies of all basic material should be given Commander Amphibious Support Force for distribution to newly assigned ships or those who have not received their material.

(7) It is recommended that officer personnel, aboard major fire support units, be given information regarding their particular assignments as early as considerations of security will permit, in order that they may be thoroughly familiar with them in time to participate intelligently in conferences.

3. BOMBARDMENT

(a) The Target Information Center, Joint Operations, proved very useful. Improvements in the system and a longer bombardment period will, it is believed, make it even more valuable. Reports of destruction or damage to targets by firing ships showed a conscientious attempt to get precise information to Commander Amphibious Support Force. With good weather, reports would have undoubtedly been more accurate, but as it was, especially on D -3 and D -2, direct observation and photographic confirmation of damage was very difficult. Mechanics of the system are far from perfect, but if a current record of reported results and photo intelligence is valuable this system is a step in the right direction.

(b) The system of serially numbering individual targets was, from this Command's standpoint, workable. It has its limitations and defects, especially where large areas are involved. Fire support ships are in the best position to comment on its usefulness. Some confusion was probably caused by the relocation of targets in the last intelligence map (cf planning, recommendations par. (b)). Some form of short cut in reporting results is, however, desirable and reports received from ships were extremely valuable in determining results accomplished.

(c) As noted elsewhere in these comments, photographic interpretation of results was handicapped by poor photos, brought on, in turn, by unsatisfactory weather conditions. As a result, accurate damage assessment was limited to those photos taken on D -1 between 0900 and 1500. As firing continued on that day until 1830, a large amount of accurate fire was delivered after 1500, unquestionably with excellent results. Even so, photographs did disclose the lack of definite

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destruction on D -3 and D -2, and the highly satisfactory results accomplished by close range fire on D -1. Reports of hits on first two days were not confirmed in many instances by photographs but the D -1 reports tallied very closely with photographs of the installations. Given the proper pictures and a longer period in which to make the **evaluated information** on damage available, it is believed that photographic interpretation will be a valuable ally to controlled, precise gunfire. It is, however, recognized that photo-interpretation too, has its limitations and in the present action undoubtedly much more was accomplished by the pre-landing bombardment than was disclosed by photography.

(d) Camouflage of installations at IWO JIMA was of a high order. It is considered that photo interpreters did excellent work in locating defenses, in spite of this. Ships and planes undoubtedly had considerable difficulty in distinguishing many targets from surrounding terrain, even though they knew where to look.

(e) The damage assessment map was delivered according to plan along with the required photographs. The original map was limited by the limitations restricting photography but a later one was printed and distributed in quantity to CTF 51 and 5th Amphibious Corps on D Day morning. This was probably too late to be useful, especially to the troops. Again, more time will permit more information earlier.

(f) The usual situation plots were maintained by the section, viz on the flag bridge and in the War Command Room. An excellent plot has been developed using a relief model on a table, covered with a sheet of clear plastic. Target areas, fire support ship responsibility areas, front lines, etc can be drawn and easily changed on the plastic, while the relief model, if well made, is far more realistic than a map.

4. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL PROCESSED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY AND MAP REPRODUCTION UNIT, USS ESTES, PERIOD OF DECEMBER 10 TO FEBRUARY 18 INCLUSIVE

(a) Photographic Laboratory:

(1) Total prints all sizes.....	57,836
(2) Total negatives processed.....	1,104
(3) Sonne rolls printed (200 ft. each)	102
(4) Rolls aerial films processed.....	29

(b) Map Reproduction:

(1) No. sheets off-set press.....	18,450
(2) Negatives.....	86
(3) Plates.....	81

UNCLASSIFIED

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COMMENTS ON SHIPS' GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. General Plan

(a) Each heavy ship was assigned an area of responsibility, all of which taken together, covered the entire island. Bombardment by destroyers for purposes of destruction was not planned, **nor** was secondary battery fire from heavy ships contemplated ~~except~~ for counterbattery and UDT cover. The plan provided on D -3 for bombardment at long and medium ranges, not less than 6000 yards offshore. For this day firing periods were arranged with the view toward having the minimum number of ships firing at one time and with the intent of having each ship fire for about six hours. For D -2 the plan provided for heavy, close range destructive bombardment of the defenses from Suribachi to Higashi from the eastward until about 1030. During this period ships assigned to the western areas were to conduct bombardment from longer ranges necessitated by safety requirements during the close bombardment from the east. At about 1030 major calibre fire from the ships working from Suribachi to the East Boat Basin was to stop as the ships withdrew sufficiently to permit ships engaging in support of the UDT's reconnaissance to take station. From this time until about 1230 the heavy ships on the east, as well as the close supporting destroyers, were to be primarily concerned with the support of UDT's. Upon completion of the UDT operation on the eastern beaches the ships assigned to the western areas from Suribachi to Hiraiwa Bay were to close and commence heavy short range bombardment while the ships assigned to the eastern beaches were to withdraw to positions clear of this fire and continue their own bombardment at longer ranges. The heavy bombardment from the west was to continue until 1430, at which time the heavy ships were to have withdrawn, permitting vessels engaged in the western UDT reconnaissance to take their stations. From about this time until the completion of the UDT operation the western bombardment was to be largely limited to 5" fire in support of these operations. Fires in the sectors to the northward were scheduled to allow each ship therein about six hours firing time. Safety considerations, both with regard to minesweeping and ricochets did not permit scheduling these vessels to approach very close to their targets. The schedule for D -1 Day contemplated a repetition of the D -2 schedule if further UDT operations (demolitions) were to take place and an extension of the close range firing periods if such operations were not to be carried out.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

(b) The plan required deliberate destructive fire at specific individual targets, and the assigned target priorities emphasized fire on defenses and installations which could most severely threaten our ships, our aircraft, the ship-to-shore movement, the landing, and operations immediately following the landing. The total number of defense installations was too great to attempt more than this in view of the limited time and ammunition available before D Day. Great emphasis on the priority principles was made not only in the plan but during the briefing, with the design of concentrating destructive fire on pillboxes, blockhouses, covered gun emplacements, etc., in the landing areas and around Suribachi and on the high ground immediately to the northward of the landing areas. Ships were specifically directed not to expend their efforts on destruction of installations in the northern parts of the island which would not threaten ships or aircraft, the landing or the early stages of subsequent operations: for example, pillboxes on the northern slopes. The fire of the ships having areas from #2 Airfield and to the northward was directed largely at coastal defense and antiaircraft guns. Continually, in briefing and during the operation, stress was laid on the importance of closing to short ranges to obtain maximum observation and destruction of pinpoint targets which presented the probability of being hit with a flat trajectory. As an aid in recognition of targets and familiarization with the areas, ships assigned to the beach areas were provided with large low oblique photographs covering their particular areas.

2. D minus 3 Day. On D -3 weather conditions until mid-afternoon were very unfavorable, with low ceiling, rain and mist. Observation from the ships and spotting planes was frequently impossible. Ships adhered to their instructions and fired only when visibility permitted reasonable observation. Prearranged schedules of fire were finally abandoned and ships were ordered to fire only when conditions permitted accurate fire and effective air spot. As a result of these unfavorable conditions, only about half the bombardment contemplated on this day was accomplished.

3. D minus 2 Day. During D -2 more effective fire was possible as visibility conditions were excellent. However, ships were not as prompt as desired in closing the range. The necessity for frequent movement to permit the deployment of units supporting UDT operations and the necessity of keeping major calibre impacts away from the beaches while swimmers were close inshore, limited the volume of effective fire. The ammunition expenditures for this day, however, approximated those originally scheduled. The D -2 schedule was adhered to as originally planned, except that the UDT operations

UNCLASSIFIED

were longer than intended, which further reduced the amount of short range bombardment. At the end of the D -2 bombardment it was apparent from reports of firing and from photographs that relatively little destruction had been accomplished due to the conditions described above, and that only by concentration on the preferred (eastern) landing beaches could adequate preparation for a landing be effected.

4. D minus 1 Day. Since no UDT operations were found necessary on D -1 a rearrangement of fire schedules was practicable. NEW YORK was assigned an eastern beach area; TEXAS was assigned coastal defense and other batteries northeast of Motoyama; VICKSBURG was assigned the area around the northeast portion of Airfield #2, which had previously been NEW YORK's responsibility. These ships were directed to close the range early and to fire as continuously as it was profitable to do so. Ammunition allowances were authorized to the extent of all bombardment ammunition on board, less the quantity scheduled for D Day fires and a reserve prescribed for one battleship. ARKANSAS was assigned the former TEXAS area in addition to her own. She and TUSCALOOSA were directed to conduct firing as practicable from as close range as would be permitted by the inevitable overs and ricochets from ships off the eastern beaches. This rearrangement of stations achieved a concentration of 4 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, and later 1 light cruiser on the defenses on and behind the eastern beaches, and on the flanks thereof. Fire from the ships on the east was deliberate and almost continuous. In general, it was delivered from very short ranges, even as low as 1800 yards. So far as could be determined from the firing reports, and observation from the flagship, ships carried out conscientiously their directives to get the utmost value from each projectile. In the forenoon TENNESSEE fired southwesterly and IDAHO northerly, primarily at the heavy casemated batteries flanking the east beach. In the afternoon they were directed to exchange stations so as to be able to reach additional targets in their areas from favorable directions. In the afternoon TEXAS was directed to give close support to the minesweepers operating off the northern shores. Ammunition expenditures, except for NEW YORK, which completed her part in the bombardment and departed the area with only 19 rounds of 14" HC remaining, fell short of the authorized expenditures by an average of 90 rounds per ship. It is doubted that in view of conditions as described above, much value could have resulted from ships expending this additional ammunition simply for the purpose of getting rid of it. Instead, it was probably of considerable value for call fires.

5. (a) Ships' reports indicated a thorough appreciation of the target priorities and conscientious compliance with their directives as to method of firing. Reports were made frequently and in considerable detail.

UNCLASSIFIED
6-5

(b) At the end of D -1 it was considered from all data available that the principal defense installations in and adjacent to the eastern beach areas were either destroyed or heavily damaged and that while more could be accomplished if another day could be allowed, the preparation was sufficient to permit a landing.

6. Support of Underwater Demolition Teams

(a) The plan for support of the Underwater Demolition Teams provided that each operation would take place after a prolonged period of heavy bombardment of the beach and flank areas; that 30 minutes prior to the departure of the UDT boats from the line of LCI(G)'s, 5" fire would be laid along the beaches and on the flanks; that this fire would initially be from the heavy ships and later from the destroyers; that the LCI(G)'s proceeding from stations 2000 yards offshore would lead the boats as far 1000 yards offshore, covering them with 40mm fire while the boats went in further to put over the swimmers. The plan included provision for communication between boats, the LCI(G)'s and destroyers. All of this close support was under the command of CTG 52.4 (Com UDT'sPhibsPac); the deep support was under the command of CTF 52.

(b) The ineffectiveness of the bombardments on D -3 Day and the limited amount of close bombardment prior to the UDT operations on D -2 undoubtedly contributed to the heavy fire drawn by the close support ships during the first UDT operation. The factors contributing to this have already been noted above.

(c) The support of the UDT operation on the eastern beaches was carried out according to plan. Heavy fire was drawn from Suribachi and, to an even greater extent, from the high ground on the north flank of the eastern beaches. This fire was extremely damaging to the LCI(G)'s and inflicted minor damage on LEUTZE. The fire is believed to have come from deeply emplaced weapons sited for the specific purpose of attacking landing craft and it may have been controlled to some extent with the aid of marker buoys noted offshore by LCI(G) personnel. During the course of the operation CTG 52.4 requested smoke along the entire eastern beach area. Smoke planes not being available at the moment, a smoke screen was laid by TENNESSEE, NEVADA and IDAHO using 5" WP projectiles. The screen was continued for the remainder of the operation. For the western UDT operation so few LCI(G)'s were in condition to provide support that it was determined not to employ them. The same destroyers were used as for the eastern beaches but they were sent in to 2000 yards from the shoreline. To obtain additional 5" fire, TENNESSEE was moved to the west and the beach area for 5" heavy

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

ship fire reassigned. Otherwise the western operation was carried out according to plan. During the western operation, smoke was again requested by CTG 52.4. The smoke planes evidently had difficulty in getting their smoke started. As a result their screen was late and laid in the wrong place and WP projectiles had to be used again. In this case, of the heavy ships engaged in 5" support, only TENNESSEE was equipped to deliver WP fire. The remainder of the screen was provided by NEVADA and IDAHO firing at about 7000 yards over Mount Suribachi, controlling their fire with air spot. No damage to our ships was experienced during the western UDT operation although some enemy fire was received.

(d) While the damage and casualties to the LCI(G)'s were unexpectedly severe, the fire which they drew focused additional attention to the threat existing on the northern flank of the eastern beaches, and in particular disclosed three heavy guns in well camouflaged concrete casemates, not previously discovered from the photographs. These guns were definitely put out of action on D -1 Day, and were not heard from again. Had the fire of these and other weapons in this area not been drawn on D -2, very heavy losses might have resulted during the landing.

7. Analysis of Bombardment

(a) During the operation. All priority A (weapons threatening aircraft, ship and UDT operations) and priority B (installations threatening the ship-to-shore movement and landing) targets were assigned serial numbers to permit more specific reference in reports and orders and for brevity in communications. Ships reported in detail on the bombardment of each assigned target. A sample of the reports is attached hereto. Continuous record of results was maintained on a card index as reports were received. These reports were checked against photographic interpretations to evaluate the progress of the bombardment. The reports were made on the Naval Gunfire Overload Circuit which was kept very busy handling them throughout the day and for several hours thereafter.

(b) The following tabulation presents in statistical form for certain types of target a comparison of the reported results and photographic interpretation.

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

I. Targets on and near beaches:-

TYPE	REPORTED BY SHIPS			DAM-::PHOTO INTERPRETATION		
TARGET	FIRED ON	DIRECT HITS	DESTROYED	AGED	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Blockhouse	14	5	7	1	9	5
Pillboxes	37	16	12	3	20	2
Covered Em- placements	8	1	3	2	4	2
DP Gun	1	0	0	0	1	0
Heavy AA MG	3	0	1	0	1	0

II. Targets in Northern High Ground Areas:-

Pillboxes	3	0	3	0	0	0
Covered Em- placements	2	0	1	0	0	0
DP Guns	21	1	2	9	2	1
Heavy AA MG	60	8	20	1	1	0

Several points must be borne in mind in considering these figures. The study does not summarize the entire bombardment. The targets listed in Table I were generally subject to direct observation for the firing ships and had little natural cover, whereas the targets listed in Table II were subject only to air observation and indirect fire. Many had some natural cover. The targets in Table I in general, presented larger areas than those in Table II. Differences exist, of course, in the manner in which ships formulate their opinions as to their results. It is considered that in the case of targets in Table I, reports were based upon good observed evidence, and that in Table II, reports were largely based upon conclusions drawn from the volume of fire and the placement of MPI. The photographs on which the assessments above were made were taken prior to 1500 on D -1. Firing, however, continued until about 1830.

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

The photographs of the beach areas were somewhat superior to those of the higher ground. In some cases, fragment effect of consequence to installations and personnel may not have shown on the photographs.

All of the foregoing is based upon information available to the Task Force Commander by the end of D -1 and indicates that with methodical bombardment, good observation, and photography, plus analysis, a reasonably sound assessment of target damage can be made prior to the landing.

8. Ammunition Expenditures; D -3 through D -1 (as reported in daily dispatches)

HIGH CAPACITY						
SHIP	: D-3	: D-2	: D-1	: TOTAL ROUNDS	: TONS	
TENNESSEE	: 127	: 251	: 434	: 812	:	
IDAHO	: 71	: 207	: 378	: 656	:	
NEVADA	: 120	: 112	: 227	: 459	:	
NEW YORK	: 204	: 251	: 567	: 1022	:	
TEXAS	: 274	: 242	: 195	: 711	:	2334. (14")
ARKANSAS	: 143	: 436	: 454	: 1033	:	382. (12")
TUSCALOOSA	: 45	: 418	: 341	: 804	:	
CHESTER	: 275	: 212	: 281	: 708	:	
SALT LAKE	:	:	:	:	:	
CITY	: 210	: 347	: 543	: 1100	:	
PENSACOLA	: 203	: 227	: 355	: 785	:	450. (8")
VICKSBURG	: 248	: 221	: 1382	: 1851	:	97. (6")
	:	:	:	: 10001	:	3263. Tons

ARMOR PIERCING			
SHIP	: NUMBER ROUNDS	: TONS	
NEVADA	: 12	:	
NEW YORK	: 19	:	
IDAHO	: 8	:	
TUSCALOOSA	: 27	:	32 tons
5" AAC, HC, Common	: 14491	:	399 tons
	:	:	3694 Tons

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

USES OF 5" AAC, HC AND COMMON

Direct Support of Minesweepers	906 rounds
Night Harassment	1533 rounds
UDT Support	7272 rounds
Counterbattery and Misc. targets	4780 rounds
	<u>14,491 rounds</u>
White Phosphorus	1091 rounds
Star Shell (Night Harassment)	187 rounds
	<u>15,768 rounds</u>

3", 40mm and 20mm not reported.

9. Recommendations

(a) That pre-landing day bombardments of major amphibious objectives continue to be directed by an Amphibious Group Commander embarked in an AGC.

(b) That pre-landing day bombardments be scheduled to extend over not less than three days, which is considered the minimum time necessary for efficient firing of the bombardment allowance at point targets. If there are to be incidental operations, including frequent movements interfering with gunfire, or if the fixed defenses are unusually strong and numerous the bombardment period should be extended accordingly.

(c) That bombardment ships be assigned areas of responsibility, to be changed only as essential during the operation. This will permit their personnel to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain and defenses they are attacking.

(d) That bombardment plans include carefully considered target priority instructions, provisions for continuous reporting of results, provisions for frequent photographic flights and photo interpretation of results, and dissemination of the Commander's evaluation of the results to the firing ships, and for the ready reassignment of targets.

(e) That each bombardment ship be provided with all practicable detailed intelligence of latest date available before the operation. This material should include large scale low obliques and stereo pairs, with suitable annotations. Each ship should be provided with at least two stereo viewers.

(f) That each bombardment ship designate an officer with

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

such assistants and facilities as necessary working in or in close conjunction with the ship's gunnery department, to make a detailed analysis of the target areas prior to bombardment, to receive all available information concerning the results of firing, and to prepare reports of such results for rapid transmission to the command having overall control of gunfire.

(g) That future gunfire plans contain ammunition loading instructions for all Fire Support Ships and those which may be called upon to serve as such.

(h) That future gunfire plans contain, in addition to present plans NEGAT and VICTOR for the control of Naval Gunfire during air strikes, a plan for placing 5 to 10 minutes of 5" fire over the antiaircraft batteries in each ship's area of responsibility just prior to an air strike.

(i) That LCI(G)'s be not employed in close support of UDT operations in heavily fortified areas until considerable reduction of the defenses has taken place.

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

APPENDIX (I)

SAMPLES OF FIRING REPORTS SUBMITTED

1. 42 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 200P X 90 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 200Y AND U X 28 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182I X DIRECT HIT TARGET 404 X NEAR HIT TARGET 306 X 26 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183C D AND E X DIRECT HITS TARGET 428 AND 437 X 138 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183L X NEAR HITS IN AREA X 57 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182U X DIRECT HIT TARGET 378 X NEAR HIT TARGET 416 413 AND 414 X 49 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182X X 6 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183W X DIRECT HIT TARGET 452 X 7 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183N X 9 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182M X 18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 166H X 18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183A X 8 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 201U X

2. TARGET 112 44 ROUNDS X 6 DIRECT HITS X BELIEVED COMPLETELY DESTROYED X CLOSED SOUTH ENTRANCE TO BLOCKHOUSE X SHRAPNEL MAY HAVE ENTERED ENTRANCE X TARGET 138 33 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY DESTROYED X BELIEVED TO BE PILLBOX CONTAINING ANTI-TANK GUN X PERSONNEL FLED AND WERE STRAFED BY 40MM X TARGET 176 6 ROUNDS X 3 DIRECT HITS X DESTROYED X BLOCKHOUSE IN 148Q 17 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY DESTROYED X PERSONNEL FLED AND WERE STRAFED X TARGET 161 11 ROUNDS X PARTIALLY DESTROYED X BLOWN OPEN ON SOUTH SIDE X 119A 14 ROUNDS X 4 DIRECT HITS X COMPLETELY DEMOLISHED X 148L 28 ROUNDS X BIRD REPORTED SEVERAL CLOSED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS X SEVERAL DIRECT HITS X PARTIALLY DESTROYED ENTRANCE X 148U TARGET 144 X PROBABLY COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 12 ROUNDS X TARGET BELIEVED TO BE 117 OR COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT IN 148Q COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 1490 BLOCKHOUSE ON BEACH COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 4 ROUNDS X

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

REPORT ON SUPPORT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL COMMENTS

(a) Advance Commander Air Support Control Units reported to Commander Amphibious Support Force (CTF 52) aboard U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) on 6 January 1945, with unit attached.

(b) Primary function of this unit at IWO JIMA was the control and direction of all aircraft activities in support of the Pre-D-Day bombardment. This function included a variety of operations. First, it complemented and supported the ships of the Gunfire and Covering Force in destroying targets on the Island. Second, it provided air protection for units engaged in minesweeping and underwater demolition operations. Third, it included routine tasks, such as air defense against enemy aircraft and submarines. Lastly it included special missions such as photographic, hydrographic and smoke.

(c) Preliminary bombardment of the objective was begun at daylight on 16 February (D -3 Day) and control of all aircraft activities in the vicinity was assumed by Advance Commander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 52. This control was maintained until 0600(K) 19 February (DOG Day) when Commander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 51, arrived and assumed control. At this time CTF 52 became CTG 51.19 and Commander Air Support Control Unit for this task group remained active in a standby status monitoring all circuits.

2. TRAINING PHASE

(a) CTF 52 sortied from PEARL HARBOR enroute to ULITHI on 10 January 1945. Prior to leaving, preparations were made for training exercises. Parallel drill circuits were placed in Joint Operations and the Inner Office for four nets. This set-up provided receiving and transmitting outlets for inter-communication between four control officers operating in Joint Operations and four in the office. Positions were prepared for eight radiomen (two to each net) for copying all transmissions.

(b) Training exercises were started the second day after sailing with the primary purpose of familiarizing personnel with voice calls and the type of missions to be used in the Operation. However, no operational maps or material

other than voice calls, were given general distribution during the training phase.

(c) After the first training exercise, remaining time enroute to ULITHI was spent participating in ships' battle problems. The purpose of these problems was to simulate battle conditions and to give the various departments opportunity to coordinate their activities.

(d) During the period at ULITHI, and enroute to SAIPAN, Air Support held daily drills over its parallel hook-up. A separate group of radiomen were also given drills each afternoon in the use of sound-power phones connecting Joint Operation, Flag Shelter, Flag Bridge, Flag Plot and CIC.

(e) During the two days of rehearsal off TINIAN a thorough test of operating equipment was obtained. Minor discrepancies were noted and final corrective action was taken.

(f) Upon arrival at the objective both personnel and material were in an excellent state of readiness.

D -3 Day

3. OPERATION

(a) On arrival at the objective all positions were manned by 0500. All circuits were tested and found ready for use. At the break of dawn it was found that the skies were heavily overcast, with weather in general very unsatisfactory for flying. Except for short periods, low ceilings, poor visibility and rain continued until later afternoon.

(b) Sorties for the day totalled 158 but due to weather only 6 support missions were executed. However, some good results were obtained. In a morning strike, airfield No. 2 was strafed and attacked with rockets by F. In this strike 3 twin-engined planes were destroyed, and one probably destroyed, on the air strip. In another mission fighters attacked two luggers discovered by an ASP plane about 35 miles from the objective. After a strafing attack both luggers were left burning and in sinking condition.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

(c) In the forenoon the weather cleared sufficiently for an attack against emplacements on SURIBACHI Mountain. The latter was again struck in late afternoon and a fighter sweep of Airfield No. 2 was executed just prior to dark.

(d) The afternoon Army Air Force heavy bomber strike arrived on station slightly ahead of schedule. The ceiling was too low for bombing but as the weather was expected to improve, the Army bombers were kept on station for one hour, the maximum that their fuel would allow. The weather did not improve and the strike was returned to base.

(e) Detail of sorties, missions and targets attacked are included in the appendices.

D -2 Day

(f) Weather was excellent for flying. 226 sorties were flown, excluding ASP and CAP sorties. Twenty-five missions were executed including one smoker, two hydrographic and three photographic missions. Support missions concentrated on dual purpose guns and automatic antiaircraft around the airfields, and on both beach areas in protection of UDT operations.

(g) In two strike groups, 8 VF carried Napalm fire bombs and used them against targets, with only a fair degree of success. Four of the bombs used did not release on first attempt and several failed to ignite after drop. Somewhat similar experiences on D -1 lead to the conclusion that the answer to effective use of Napalm by plane drop has not been obtained. It is recommended that training in CVE groups with Napalm be continued with emphasis on improvement of equipment used, methods of release, and tactics to follow in making low altitude drops.

(h) The smoke mission in support of UDT's operating off the western beaches was poorly executed. Four planes carried smoke tanks. Although three made releases, only one was satisfactory.

(i) Support missions against antiaircraft and DP guns were well executed. Results were in general obscure but the Air Coordinator reported in most instances that areas were given a thorough going-over. One direct hit on a pillbox on

the south eastern beaches resulted in a heavy explosion and fire. Strafing planes destroyed a total of ten trucks near East Boat Basin.

(j) Light antiaircraft was intense throughout the day. Heavy antiaircraft was intense only during the strike on the southern part of the island by 42 Army Liberators. This strike was effective in that the majority of the bombs, dropped from 5000 feet, hit in the target area. There were however, some premature bursts at about 2000 feet. Photographs showed no known installations hit by these bombs, but the fragments may have caused some damage and casualties.

D -1 Day

(k) Weather was only partially good for flying. Throughout most of the day the sky was overcast with low hanging clouds. Most strikes were made thru breaks in cloud formations. By 1330 when the Army land-based bombing group arrived, a layer of low clouds with ceiling at 2000 feet held up the strike. The strike eventually was cancelled and the formation was returned to base.

(l) Sorties flown totalled 28 excluding TCAP and TASP. Missions totalled 27, of which 21 were of the direct support type. Support missions were concentrated largely against positions flanking the landing beaches. The SURIBACHI Mountain area was repeatedly attacked by both fighters and bombers, a total of six missions hitting the northeastern slopes where heavy antiaircraft and dual purpose guns were grouped. On the flank of the beaches the wooded, camouflaged area overlooking the East Boat Basin was struck repeatedly with Napalm, rockets and bombs.

(m) Results for the day are difficult to assess. It is, however, believed that support aircraft functioned better than on the preceding two days. Pilots appeared more familiar with their targets and attacked more deliberately. The Air Coordinators made several observation flights which resulted in pin-pointing of certain targets, and a consequent increase in effectiveness. Concentration attacks on targets, relatively few in number but studded with numerous installations, convincingly weakened the areas commanding the landing beaches.

(n) By early afternoon reports from the SURIBACHI area showed that antiaircraft had slackened appreciably. Light anti-aircraft was again intense in other areas. One Support Group of 8 VF and 8 VT reported after a strike that practically all torpedo planes had received hits, with four badly shot up. Only one of these planes, however, failed to reach base. All personnel from the crashed plane were rescued.

4. PHOTOGRAPHIC STRIKES

(a) Bad visibility prevented the completion of any photographic missions on D -3. On the following day three missions were run and drops on the ESTES successfully made. Low obliques of the landing beaches and SURIBACHI area were excellent. Verticals were unsatisfactory for damage assessment as a 6 inch focal length camera was used in the expectation that a low ceiling would require low altitude flights. However, the ceiling lifted and photographs were taken at 5000 to 6000 feet resulting in a scale of 1:12,000 instead of 1:5000 as called for in the plan.

(b) All deliveries of film were accomplished successfully and promptly.

(c) On D -1, three missions were successfully made. Proper focal length of lens was used and all pictures, verticals and obliques, were uniformly good. One photographic plane received hits in the wing but was able to return to base safely.

5. CHICHI JIMA AND HAHAI JIMA STRIKES

(a) Morning and afternoon strikes against CHICHI JIMA and HAHAI JIMA were scheduled by Commander Support Carrier Group (CTG 52.2) for all three days preceding the landing. At least two of these strikes were not completed because of bad weather. Available to this command on incomplete reports are the following results on D -2 Day.

(b) At CHICHI JIMA 12-15 operational single engine and twin-engine planes were found on the morning strike. These planes were strafed. One Betty is reported as probably destroyed, one Topsy probably damaged. The afternoon strike strafed three enemy planes on the ground, none of which flamed.

(c) 15-18 small craft were observed in the cove north

of SUSAKI Airfield.

(d) The afternoon strike reported that one 75 foot ammunition barge exploded and three small craft flamed after strafing.

(e) At HAH A JIMA various small craft were strafed in the coves. No damage is reported.

6. AIR DEFENSE

(a) Enroute from ULITHI via SAIPA N to IWO JIMA TG 52.2 furnished an eight plane Combat Air Patrol for control by U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) in the Movement Group area. Tracking and communications practice was obtained but no enemy planes were encountered.

(b) At the objective area an eight plane CAP was furnished by TG 52.2 to U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) for Fighter direction control from approximately 0620 to 1815 each day from D -3 Day to D -1 Day, inclusive. Primary Fighter Direction was delegated alternately to DD's BENNION, STEMBEL and BRYANT.

(c) No enemy planes were intercepted. It is believed that only two enemy planes appeared in the area during daylight. One, a Zeke apparently from IWO JIMA, was shot down by an OS2U from U.S.S. PENSACOLA early in the morning of D -3 Day. (No other planes are believed to have landed on or taken off from IWO JIMA.) The other, reported as an Irving, was sighted and chased by the Air Coordinator on the morning of D -1. CAP was vectored but bogey apparently saw the TBM chasing him and escaped at top speed low on the water.

(d) No night CAP was available during this three day period. The following enemy planes are regarded as the total of authentic enemy planes during darkness:

(1) At 0640(K) on D -2 the picket HALLIGAN, one of two DD's stationed 80 miles north of IWO JIMA, was attacked by three twin-engine planes receiving no damage and destroying one by antiaircraft.

(2) At 1957(K) on D -2 the TWIGGS shot down a bogey first reported by the picket 80 miles north and later tracked into the objective area.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

(3) About 2130(K) on D -1, one or two planes flying at about 100 feet altitude successfully bombed GAMBLE (DM) and BLESSMAN (APD). Radar reports on this plane were practically nil although there were a few weak and quickly fading contacts. Use of radar not indicated. BLESSMAN believed enemy homed visually on wake, as ship was making 22 knots while attempting to join a movement group, and wake was phosphorescent. At 0615(K) DOG Day Force Fighter Direction in U.S.S. ELDORADO relieved Force Fighter Director Officer in U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12).

7. COMMUNICATIONS: Fighter Direction and Inter Fighter Director nets were generally satisfactory. Further comments have been made in the communications report. Use of authenticators was nil.

8. WEATHER: On D -3 and D -1 Days weather was poor for flying and particularly poor for visibility. Practically solid cover existed from lower levels of 100 to 7000 feet up to undetermined top level. CAP was kept at or below mattress on D -2 Day. Flying weather and visibility were good.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That position of CVE's and nearby CV's be obtained by ECM hourly.

(b) That definite information be obtained from CVE's and from U.S.S. ESTES on desirability and feasibility of operating the U.S.S. ESTES YE/YG.

(c) That CVE's, particularly on first day of operation, brief pilots more thoroughly on location of base to which they are to report.

(d) That CVE's and CV's check outgoing planes carefully for IFF and pancake them if they are not showing IFF.

(e) That CVE's be briefed on new CentComTWO VHF channel designations, e.g. "Uncle" for SAD primary and "William" for Fighter Director Primary.

(f) That pilots flying one type of mission be thoroughly briefed on channels in use by planes on other missions, so that if, for example, an Anti-Sub Patrol Plane sees a bogey

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

and later sees the CAP searching for it he may pass information to them that he is not the bogey and that the bogey is flying such and such a course.

(g) That ASP plane radio equipment be checked carefully.

10. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

General Comments

(a) The Air Plan called for target ASP planes to use a specialized voice call. This had two purposes in view, (1) to identify its patrol sector and (2) to differentiate it from local ASP planes, who were using a simple plane call plus the carrier call. For example, 1 Able Sabre for TASP meant that this plane, from carrier whose voice call was Sabre, was assigned from flight Able and had sector 1 to patrol. During the operation many TASP planes did not use this specialized call, thus creating confusion and resulting in unnecessary transmissions.

(b) Difficulty was encountered in planes coming up on wrong frequencies and using the wrong IFF code.

(c) An overlap of 30 minutes should be set-up for relieving planes. In this way each sector has 30 minutes of two-plane search. At least this much time is needed to receive all position reports and to instruct relieving plane.

D -3 Day

(d) No contact. Planes were late in reporting on station due to bad weather. Sectors were only partially flown as weather conditions permitted. Total sorties: 20.

D -2 Day

(e) No submarine contacts reported. Plane on sector 4 was given permission to strafe 3 small luggers on the east side of KITA IO JIMA. Total sorties: 42.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

D -1 Day

(f) Two submarine contacts were reported. PC 800 reported contact bearing 145° distance 8 miles from Point H~~OT~~~~EL~~~~AND~~~~ER~~~~S~~. Relief plane for Sector 4, voice call 392 Ruler, was ordered to the scene for Hunter-Killer Operations. Upon arrival at scene the contact was classified as non-sub and plane ordered to Sector 4 for patrol.

(g) The second contact was reported by U.S.S. BREESE, bearing 110° distance 20 miles from U.S.S. ESTES. 392 Ruler, the nearest plane, was again vectored to the contact. This plane worked with the destroyer for 2½ hours. All attacks were made by the destroyer and the contact was finally evaluated as non-submarine. Attack was ordered off by competent authority.

(h) Total sorties: 26 - Planes were remaining on station for three hours in contrast with 1½ hour patrols on D -2.

11. AIR SEA RESCUE OPERATIONS

(a) The chart and chronological incidents below represent Air-Sea Rescue Operations from D -3 to D -1 inclusive:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLANE</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>LOST</u>	<u>SAVED</u>
Feb. 16	OS2U	Operational		1
Feb. 16	FM-2	Probably Operational	1	
Feb. 16	FM-2	Combat		1
Feb. 17	TBM	Combat		3
Feb. 18	FM-2	Operational		1
Feb. 18	TBM	Combat		3

February 16, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At 0745 an OS2U from the U.S.S. NEW YORK made a forced

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

landing due to engine trouble at a point 15,000 yards, bearing 198° T from Mount SURIBACHI. As a result of the forced landing the wing tip float of the plane was broken.

The destroyer HALL immediately stood-by the damaged plane and was shortly relieved by the sea-plane tender WILLIAMSON.

At 0800 the SALT LAKE CITY was directed to recover the plane. At 0835 the Flag Bridge reported that all personnel had been rescued but that the plane was lost. Names of crew unavailable.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2

One VF from the SARGENT BAY of the Target Combat Air Patrol, which arrived on station at 0930 never succeeded in joining up with his group.

After arriving in the area, he stated that he didn't know where he was but believed that he was somewhere "west of the weather front." (At this time the front was from east to west).

CIC could contact him only through the DD BENNION and the DD STEMBEL. CIC instructed him to turn on emergency IFF. He received the transmission but was apparently unable to turn on his emergency IFF.

The last course that he was known to be on, according to his own report, was 090° T.

CIC gave him a vector of 070° but received no acknowledgement. Thereafter we heard no more from him, but CTU 52.2.1 was in contact with him for a short time.

The plane failed to return to base and no further reports have been received.

Anti-Submarine patrol planes were alerted to be on the lookout for the lost plane. Name of pilot unavailable.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3

At 1715, during a strafing attack on Mount SURIBACHI, a VF from the LUNGA POINT was reported to be smoking from his

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

by antiaircraft.

At 1715, a "crash" report was heard giving his position as three miles, bearing 300° T from Mount SURIBACHI. It was reported that the pilot had climbed out of the plane and got into his rubber boat.

The DMS HOPKINS observed the crash, and immediately proceeded to the scene. Meanwhile CTF 52 despatched the DD MULLANY to effect the rescue.

At 1724, the HOPKINS was alongside the survivor, and the MULLANY's mission was cancelled.

Rescue was completed at 1730 and the LUNGA POINT notified. Pilot's name: Ensign Stevenson.

February 17, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At 1730 a VT from the PETROF BAY, call 387 Circus, made a water landing at position reported as four miles bearing 330° T from Mount SURIBACHI. All personnel were observed to get out into life-raft. Two ships started heading for scene, the HOWARD (DMS 7) and the YMS 340. The HOWARD arrived first and picked up the three survivors. Names not available.

February 18, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At dawn two VT's from the ANZIO were launched on a special search for a survivor reported 17 February by a B-29 at position 214 miles bearing 089° T from IWO JIMA. Both planes were equipped with droppable survival gear.

At 0815 these planes reported sighting a survivor 127 miles bearing 090° T from IWO JIMA - which distance was later changed to 135 miles. At 0940 the TEXAS launched an OS2U for rescue mission. At 1040 an ARKANSAS VOS joined up, established communications with him and they proceeded on mission.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

At 1200 the VOS's arrived at scene where VT's were still orbiting and relieved them. The TEXAS plane immediately landed and effected rescue.

The VOS's returned to base and the survivor was placed aboard the WILLIAMSON which delivered him to the ESTES.

The pilot was from the NATOMA BAY - plane call Ruler 32 - and was launched pre-dawn as a part of the first LCAP on 16 February. He never succeeded in joining up due to weather conditions and became hopelessly lost in a storm. He made a water landing seven hours later at 1330. The loss of the plane was never reported to Commander Air Support Control Unit.

Pilot was not survivor orbited by B-29. Name: Ensign D.P. Valpey. Condition: Good.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2

At 1400 a report was received of a VF forced down due to antiaircraft after a bombing run. Position: four miles due north of Mount SURIBACHI.

A VOF pilot reported that a ship was headed toward the three survivors who were in a rubber boat with dye marker showing.

At 1437 VICKSBURG reported that the PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590) was picking up survivors.

The aircraft's parent was MAKIN ISLAND - call of plane 312 Fido. Names: Lieutenant (jg) H.A. Hughs, D.A. Haas, ARM3c, D.C. Smith, AMMlc. Condition: Not reported but assumed satisfactory.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3

At 1715 the picket destroyers stationed about 80 miles northeast of IWO JIMA relayed a message from a BENNINGTON VB - call 281 Legion, stating that possibly two parachutes had gone down at a position one mile due west of the highest point of CHICHI JIMA, which would place them in Futain Harbor. There was no report of rubber boat or dye marker. No action was taken by TF 52 on this report.

12. COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

(a) Prior to arrival at the objective, conferences were held with representatives of Staff Intelligence and Naval Gunfire with the purpose of coordinating surface bombardment with air strikes. As a result of these conferences, a list of targets was prepared; the targets being given priority ratings in accordance with their relative importance to the task given to the Amphibious Support Force. This list was divided into three groupings. One group consisted of targets which Naval Gunfire could handle most effectively. Another group was made up of those targets that could be hit better by aircraft. The last group were targets which were assigned jointly to air and gunfire. It was understood that targets in either of the first two groups might be fired upon by either gunfire or air, but that in general target assignments would follow the groupings.

(b) This arrangement worked excellently in operation. The majority of targets, attacked by aircraft of an Advance Air Support Control Unit, are of the pre-determined type. This is especially true of the first day, when there has been little opportunity for accurate target spotting. The advantage of a previously prepared list of targets which can be most effectively attacked, is obvious. It is recommended that this practice be continued.

13. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) On the whole communications were excellent. A few mechanical failures were experienced but were quickly corrected by the technicians on duty.

(b) The Air-Sea Rescue net was used effectively. Army land based planes used this net for reporting in and results were good. Considerable interference from C.W., was noticed occasionally but did not block out messages.

(c) For much of the time the HK net had C.W., and other interference. Traffic was light and incoming signals were readable. In the sole instance where HK tactics were employed, the surface vessel (BREESE DM 18) could be reached by neither this ship (on HK, GW or LAW) nor the plane assigned to work with it. Commander Air Support Control Unit, over HK, had perfect communications with the plane. The latter communicated

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

with the BREESE via blinker.

(d) The ASC(HF) proved successful. Traffic was not heavy and only Commanders of CVE task group and units were on with Advance Commander Air Support Control Units. ASC(VHF) was not used but it is doubtful that it would have functioned because of 5 X 5 feed over from 37.2 mcs. used by Underwater Demolition Teams.

(e) The General Warning net was used for general alerts and traffic was very light.

(f) The local air warning net was used for communications by all anti-submarine patrol planes. Radio discipline was bad and frequently messages had to be repeated. Local carrier anti-submarine pilots should be thoroughly briefed on radio discipline and patrol plans. In several instances important transmissions from long range anti-submarine patrol planes (TASP) were cut out by local ASP. Contact with TASP planes was difficult at times; some being off frequency and others having faulty equipment.

(g) The SAD(S) (5135 kcs) was not used as planned, primarily because of plane equipment failure. In one instance the transmitter on a plane was 70 kcs. off frequency, and several planes had to come up on SAD-1 or SAD-2 for any communications. It is recommended HF radio equipment in planes be thoroughly checked before leaving the carrier.

(h) The SAD(VHF) - nets (140.02 and 140.58) using TDQ transmitters and RCK receivers were very satisfactory. However, at least one spare TDQ should be installed in each AGC, and RCK receivers are recommended for use in voice filter.

(i) General Comments

(1) C.W. caused considerable interference on all HF nets but did not completely block out any transmissions.

(2) Wave traps were used successfully to reduce feed-over on several circuits and it is recommended that they be made part of permanent installation.

(3) RAO-4 receivers were satisfactory except for

band switches and phasing controls. Structural weaknesses were the cause of most trouble.

(4) Feed-over from inter-commander Air Support Control Unit nets was nil.

14. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Weather conditions with moderately high ceiling and fair visibility is considered of major importance to effective air operations during the bombardment phase. During this phase all pilots lack complete familiarity with the target area and some pilots lack experience in this type of work. Precision bombing and firing is mandatory in order to obtain the desired results and it is therefore necessary that all pilots be able to locate the assigned targets definitely and accurately and have sufficient ceiling to make precise firing runs. When low ceiling and reduced visibility are encountered at the objective which is defended by intense antiaircraft it is not practicable for pilots to study their targets in advance. They must then resort to a hasty procedure that is not conducive to precise bombing and destructive results.

(b) Coordination and cooperation between Naval Gunfire and Air Support Control was excellent and functioned smoothly and promptly. This degree of coordination was made possible by the fact that both Naval Gunfire and Air Support were controlled exclusively from the Joint Operations room affording continuous direct contact and mutual exchange of information with a minimum of delay. A target index prepared by Staff Intelligence was used jointly by both Air Support and Naval Gunfire and it proved to be very helpful. It is strongly recommended that Air Support and Naval Gunfire continue to be controlled from the Joint Operations Room.

(c) There were, as usual, entirely too many "Bogeys" reported which later proved to be friendly. This problem is serious at present and will increase in importance in future operations. It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of a Filter Center afloat at the objective. A Filter Center adequately manned and equipped plus strictly enforced air discipline among friendly aircraft may well prove to be one solution to this identification problem. Such a Filter Center should be separate and distinct from the present CIC.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

(d) In order to assist in promptly evaluating the results of air attacks during the bombardment phase it is recommended that the Air Coordinator carry a photographer and each target be photographed immediately upon completion of the attack. These photographs can be dropped to the command ship when the Air Coordinator leaves the vicinity and prompt photographic interpretation may then be accomplished. The Air Coordinator should continue to make his own observations and report the results in addition to this photographic coverage. This photographic function should be carried out in addition to the Air Coordinator's normal duties and should not in any way interfere with the performance of those duties.

E. C. Parker

E.C. PARKER,
Captain, U.S.N.

Commander Air Support Control Unit,
Amphibious Group ONE.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

APPENDIX I

SORTIES DETAIL

(1) Sorties

	<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>VHB</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
D -3	147	56	36	239
D -2	181	113	42	336
D -1	<u>198</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>318</u>
	526	265	102	893

(2) Sorties Detail

(A) Available
Support
Missions

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VF	84	107	128	319
VT	32	62	58	152
VHB	36	42	24	102

(B) For Photos

VF	2	6	6	14
VT	1	3	3	7
SpCinCPac			1	1

(C) For Hydrographic Work

VT	3	2	3	8
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(D) For Smoke Mission

VT		4	5	9
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ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(E) Target CAP				
VF	61	68	64	193
(F) ASP				
VT	<u>20</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>88</u>
	239	336	318	893

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

APPENDIX II

MISSIONS DETAIL

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Support (Navy)	6	18	21	45
Support (Army)		1		1
Photographic	1	3	3	7
Hydrographic	3	2	3	8
Smoke	-	<u>1</u>	-	<u>1</u>
	10	25	27	62

ENCLOSURE (E) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON UDT OPERATIONS

1. (a) The scheduled operations of the Underwater Demolition Teams prior to D Day were in brief:-

- (1) Reconnaissance of Eastern beaches on D -2 forenoon.
- (2) Reconnaissance of Western beaches on D -2 afternoon.
- (3) Demolition operations either on night of D -2/D -1 or on D -1, or both, as found necessary in reconnaissance, to remove obstacles, natural or man-made, which might be found in the approaches to the beaches. Removal of anti-boat mines. Marking channels.
- (4) Assembly and dissemination of information on the foregoing.

(b) The UDT operations, including operations of the close supporting DD's and LCI(G)'s, were under the command of CTG 52.4 (ComUDT'sPac). Only a brief summary of the operations is given here. As CTG 52.4 will cover the operations fully in his action report.

2. The reconnaissance operation on the Eastern beaches took place on D -2 with ROGER hour (the time boats containing UDT personnel and LCI(G)'s in close support commenced approaching the beach from positions 2000 yards offshore) at 1100(K). Heavy fire was directed by the enemy at these craft, probably from the high ground between the East Boat Basin and MOTOYAMA, possibly also from SURIBACHI and remaining blockhouses and pill boxes not destroyed on the slopes behind the beaches. All LCI(G)'s were hit, LCI(G) 474 so badly that she later was sunk (in 100 fathoms of water) by our gunfire. LCI(G)'s suffered many casualties. LEUTZE was damaged and her C.O. seriously wounded. No damage is known to have been received by UDT boats. At the request of CTG 52.4 smoke was laid with W.P. projectiles along the ridge from SURIBACHI to about 400 yards north of East Boat Basin. This smoke plus increased rate of neutralization fire, appeared to decrease effectiveness of enemy fire.

3. Despite the heavy fire the UDT personnel carried out successfully their mission of reconnaissance. One swimmer was not recovered, and is believed to have been hit by enemy fire. The operation was completed about 1300. The reconnaissance disclosed that there were no underwater obstacles in the beach approaches and that surf and beach conditions were suitable for landing.

ENCLOSURE (E) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATION IN THE TWO JIMA OPERATIONS

4. Damage to all the available LCI(G)'s necessitated their elimination from the support of reconnaissance of the Western beaches. ROGER hour was 1615(K). Destroyers in support closed to 2000 yards of the shoreline instead of remaining at 3000 yards. Fire was drawn, but was less intense than off the Eastern beaches, and neither damage nor casualties are known to have occurred. Again WP projectile smoke was laid by battleships. The operation was completed about 1800(K). The reconnaissance disclosed that the Western beaches were free of underwater obstacles and that beach and surf conditions were suitable for landing.

5. In view of the information obtained on reconnaissance no demolition operations were considered to be necessary and none was undertaken.

6. Recommendations regarding fire support of Underwater Demolition operations are contained in Enclosure (C). Comment and recommendations on the actual operation of the UDT's are withheld pending receipt of the report of CTG 52.4.

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON MINESWEEPING
16 February 1945, (D -3)

1. Minesweeping operations were started on schedule by TU 52.3.1, consisting of the HOPKINS (DMS 13), HAMILTON (DMS 18), CHANDLER (DMS 9), DORSEY (DMS 1), HOWARD (DMS 7), and HOGAN (DMS 6) commenced sweeping Sweep Area ONE at 0600(K) for moored and acoustic mines, completing the area at 1206(K).

2. Sweep Area THIRTEEN, north of 24° 30' N., meanwhile was being swept for the same types of mines by the SERENE (AM 300), SHELTER (AM 301), and STRATEGY (AM 308) from TU 52.3.4, with PC 800 as mine disposal vessel. This unit started the sweep at 0600(K) and completed at 1500(K), with negative results. However, at 0830(K) a mine was reported on the surface which was identified as a floating Japanese Type 93 Model 3 and was sunk by gunfire from the PC 800, at ten miles 122° (T) from Mt. SURIBACHI.

3. Mark VI drill mine cases were planted as buoys to mark the inshore limits of the swept area in Sweep Area FIVE, which was swept for moored, acoustic, and magnetic mines by CHAMPION (AM 314), ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318), TU 52.3.5, together with STRENGTH (AM 309) and SUCCESS (AM 310) from TU 52.3.4 to do the magnetic sweeping. During the sweep of the area, shore installations, particularly from target areas 166 B, E and 167 A, B, opened fire upon the unit which was returned by them and their support vessel BREESE (DM 18). The entire area was swept by 1610(K), with the exception of the area 1000 yards east and west from HIGASHI IWA, which was not swept because of the shoals there. The DEFENSE (AM 317) fouled her sweep gear on an underwater object bearing 212° (T), distance 6100 yards from Mt. SURIBACHI.

4. After the first pass was made in Sweep Area ONE, three ships of TU 52.3.1, then left the formation and commenced operations in Sweep Area FOUR for moored and acoustic mines, starting at 0712(K) and completing at 1230(K). These three ships were then joined by the rest of the vessels in TU 52.3.1 which had been completing Sweep Area ONE, and the entire unit made one pass for moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Area THREE between the 300 and 500 fathom curves, completing at 1457(K).

5. The REVEL (AM 284) from TU 52.3.4 joined as a magnetic sweeper with TU 52.3.3 comprising the SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304), SPECTACLE (AM 305),

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

SPECTER (AM 306), and TRACY (DM 19) in a moored, acoustic and magnetic sweep of Sweep Area TWO. This unit was the only one which completed its minesweeping schedule within the assigned time on this day, completing area TWO at 1102(K) and then executing a sweep for the same types of mines in Sweep Area SIX, finishing the latter area at 1632(K). No mines were swept in any area, and generally the sweeping was without incident.

17 February 1945, (D -2)

6. Operations were again commenced on schedule with TU 52.3.1, consisting of the same ships as the previous day, executing a sweep for moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Area FOURTEEN, completing at 1022(K). The unit then returned for screening duty, all of the minesweeping task units being assigned to the screen upon completion of each day's sweeping assignment.

7. It had been planned for TU 52.3.6 (composed of TU 52.3.7, YMS's 288, 323, 362, 374, 401, 426, 428, and LINDSEY (DM 32) with SPECTACLE (AM 305) from TU 52.3.3) and TU 52.3.8 (YMS's 193, 235, 345, 361, 407, 475, and SC 1054 with SPECTER (AM 306) from TU 52.3.3) to make one pass for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines through Sweep Area NINE starting at 0800(K), but as the unit made their approach, they were fired upon by shore batteries and were ordered to retire by CTG 52.3. Heavy fire support units were brought up for cover, and the sweep was started at 0940(K). During the sweep, the unit was fired upon again from shore, which fire was returned by vessels of the unit and the covering heavy fire support ships. Dan buoys were laid to mark the inshore limit of the area swept, being laid at 1000 yards intervals by YMS 193 and YMS 401. The YMS 362 fouled her gear on an underwater object during the sweep. The area was completed at 1055(K) with negative results. The unit then retired to the south until time to start the sweep of Sweep Area TEN.

8. Sweep Area EIGHT, except the inshore 25% was swept by TU 52.3.5 (ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318) and CHAMPION (AM 314)), and drew fire from shore batteries from the east corner of IWO JIMA while sweeping for moored and acoustic mines in that area. The fire was returned by ships of the unit, with results unreported. Upon completion of the sweep of this area, TU 52.3.5 was scheduled to make one pass through Sweep Area THREE between the 200 and 300 fathom curves for moored and acoustic mines.

9. In Sweep Area SEVEN, TU 52.3.4, consisting of SERENE (AM 300), SHELTER (AM 301), STRATEGY (AM 308), STRENGTH (AM 309),

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

SUCCESS (AM 310), REBEL (AM 284), and PS 800 drew 40mm fire from the island while executing a sweep for moored and acoustic mines. The unit returned the fire and was ordered to retire by CTG 52.3 until fire support vessels arrived.

10. TU 52.3.6, composed of the same vessels that swept in area NINE in the morning, was to commence operations in Sweep Area TEN at 1300(K), but the sweep did not start until 1430(K) when heavy fire support ships and two destroyers were ready to give covering fire. One pass was made through the area for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines, the sweepers drawing fire from the island which was returned by them and the heavy fire support ships. Some of the sweepers were seen to even be firing their .50 caliber machine guns. The area was completed at 1615(K) without any casualties.

11. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304)), less SPECTACLE and SPECTER which were operating with TU 52.3.6, operated with the screen during the entire day, having no sweeping assignment. As the other minesweeping task units completed their assigned sweeping schedules, they were ordered to the screen.

12. CTG 52.3 reported that all scheduled areas were completed prior to 1800(K), with the sole exception of the inshore 25% of Sweep Area EIGHT.

18 February 1945, (D -1)

13. Sweep Area THIRTEEN was completed by a sweep for moored and acoustic mines south of 24° 30' N. by TU 52.3.5, by the same vessels which had swept in Sweep Area EIGHT the previous day. The unit was to commence operations in the area at 0600(K), and the sweep was reported as being completed at 1648(K), a long operation.

14. At 1445(K), heavy fire support ships moved around on the north side of IWO JIMA to give covering fire for the completion of sweeping on that side of the island where the minesweeping vessels had encountered a considerable amount of fire on the previous day. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304), SPECTACLE (AM 305), SPECTER (AM 306)) swept Sweep Area SEVEN for magnetic mines, and again drew fire from the island which was returned. Meanwhile, TU 52.3.4, composed of the same ships which had swept in Sweep Area SEVEN on DOG minus TWO, was sweeping Sweep Area EIGHT for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines, making one

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

pass inshore of the 100 fathom curve and then between IWO JIMA and HIGASHI IWA, completing at 1545(K). This unit also drew fire from shore installations which was returned by the unit and the heavy fire support ships which were furnishing excellent covering fire.

15. Since TU 52.3.1 (HOPKINS (DMS 13), HAMILTON (DMS 18), CHANDLER (DMS 9), DORSEY (DMS 1), HOWARD (DMS 7), HOGAN (DMS 6), BREESE (DM 18)) and TU 52.3.6 (YMS's 323, 362, 374, 401, 426, 478, 288, 407, 193, 235, 345, 361, 475 and SC 1054) had no minesweeping assignments, they were refueled and assigned to the screen. Other units were assigned to the screen as they completed the areas assigned to them.

16. CTG 52.3 visual dispatch to CTF 52 of 180644 advised that he considered the minesweeping to date sufficient until the island is taken. No mines were swept during the three days of sweeping, and no casualties were suffered by any vessel of TG 52.3 while engaged in minesweeping operations.

17. The GAMBLE (DM 15) was hit by a bomb from a low-flying twin engine bomber at 2255(K) while on screening duty and was taken in tow by the HAMILTON (DMS 18).

ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON BATTLE DAMAGE

1. PENSACOLA (CA 24)

Hit by enemy shore batteries at 0936 (K) 17 February with two shells of about 8" caliber and four shells believed to be 6" and 3.5".

Damage - Compartments A302A, 400A, A309L flooded; CIC rendered inoperative; one plane destroyed, catapult damaged; one 5" gun inoperative; sick bay flooded; degaussing cable cut.

Ship's force controlled fires and flooding, made all necessary temporary repairs.

2. LCI(G)'s 474, 441, 473, 438, 449, 457, 466, 471, 469, 450, 346, 348.

Hit by enemy shore batteries, mortar or small caliber fire on morning of 17 February while covering UDT beach reconnaissance.

Damage - LCI(G) 474 capsized as a result of underwater damage and was ordered sunk during the afternoon of 17 February. Four LCI(G)'s received temporary repairs from TERROR and one from ESTES, during night of 17 February. LCI(G)'s 441 and 473 had permanent machinery casualties requiring towing from objective. LCI(G)'s 438, 449, 457, 466, 471, required extensive repairs but were able to proceed under own power. LCI(G)'s 450 and 469 required above-water hull repairs only. LCI(G)'s 346 and 348 were fully repaired by 18 February.

3. BLESSMAN (APD 48)

Bombed at 2130 18 February.

Damage - Hit starboard side amidships over forward fireroom in troop spaces. One engine and fireroom were damaged as well as much topside equipment. Power and water pressure were lost temporarily.

GILMER (APD 11) assisted in extinguishing fires and BLESSMAN was taken in tow by ARDENT (AM 340)

ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

4. GAMBLE (DM 15)

Bombed about 2200, 18 February; hit by two 250 pound bombs.

Damage - Both firerooms flooded, both boilers exploded, all power lost.

HAMILTON (DMS 18) went alongside and brought fires and flooding under control. GAMBLE was taken in tow by DORSEY (DMS 1).

5. LEUTZE (DD 481)

Hit by shell of about 3" caliber from enemy shore batteries at 1106(K), 17 February.

Damage - Forward stack, stack partition, uptake, and air casing of number one boiler holed. Additional minor topside damage. Ship remained operational.

ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Casualties were sustained as follows:

	<u>W.I.A.</u>	<u>M.I.A.</u>	<u>K.I.A.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
U.S.S. PENSACOLA	98	0	17	115
LCI Group 449	20	0	17	37
457	16	0	0	16
466	18	1	4	23
469	7	0	0	7
471	6	0	11	17
473	30	0	0	30
438	2	0	0	2
441	27	0	6	33
450	6	0	0	6
U.S.S. TENNESSEE	4	0	0	4
U.S.S. LEUTZE (DD 481)	4	0	0	4
U.S.S. BLESSMAN (APD 48)	11	0	0	11
UDT Teams embarked in BLESSMAN	20	0	2	22
U.S.S. WASMUTH (DMS 15)	2	0	0	2
U.S.S. BATES	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	272	1	57	330

The U.S.S. GAMBLE (DM 15) was hit by a bomb but did not make a casualty report to this Command. The casualty report from UDT's has not yet been received.

2. Medical care was rendered and the casualties kept aboard the larger ships in which they occurred. The smaller vessels transferred their cases to any convenient ship which could take them. The U.S.S. TERROR (CM5) took fifty-eight cases from the LCI Group. The remaining cases were treated aboard NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, and ESTES (AGC 12).

3. Due to necessity for not impeding combat operations transfer to the larger ships was sometimes slow and required, in many cases, repeated handling through small boats and APD's.

4. Medical supplies and facilities were adequate in all ships. Excellent first-aid was rendered aboard the small vessels.

ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

5. RECOMMENDATION: That in future operations it be stressed that during the pre-invasion phase, each ship and unit must make a personnel casualty report to its Unit Commander, giving number of personnel wounded, missing and killed in action. This report to be sent daily by 1700. Unit Commanders in turn should report to the Task Force Commander, casualties aboard each ship and unit under his Command. This report to be sent not later than 1800 daily.

ENCLOSURE (I) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON WEATHER
16-18 February 1945 (D -3 to D Day)

1. As Task Force 52 approached IWO JIMA, a moderate low was centered 600 miles to the northeast, with a front extending south of the target into a new wave development, then located about 200 miles to the west. We encountered the warm front of the wave late on the night of the 15th, and at dawn had a low broken to overcast of strato-cumulus at 1000 feet, and intermittent light rain. Because of low ceiling and visibility, conditions for spotting as well as air strikes were very poor at the opening of the action on 16 February.

2. The center of the wave development apparently passed just to the north of IWO JIMA at about 0900, when the wind shifted from southwest 12 knots to northwest 10 knots. Intermittent rain and low cloud did not break until 1400, when rain stopped, lower clouds gave way to an alto-stratus, alto-cumulus overcast at 9000 feet, and visibility improved to 12 miles. Conditions for spotting, gunfire and low level air strikes were satisfactory, but the B-24 strike scheduled for the afternoon was sent back. The sea was gentle, confused.

3. By the morning of the 17th the cold front had moved 300 miles southeast of IWO JIMA, and our weather was characterized by broken alto-cumulus clouds above 10,000 feet. Unlimited ceiling and visibility prevailed throughout the day. Weather was excellent for all types of operations, with wind from the northwest, 6 knots and a slight sea from northwest.

4. The good weather was short-lived. Another wave was located, forming just east of FORMOSA. By midnight of the 17th an alto-stratus overcast had formed and the following morning dawned with 6/10 of strato-cumulus and intermittent light rain. This wave was very small and moved rapidly, its center passing south of IWO JIMA by 2000 on the 18th. The lower clouds were variable in amount and visibility averaged 6 to 10 miles. Conditions were satisfactory for close range gunfire, spotting, and low-level air strikes, but again the B-24 strikes were cancelled because of 8/10 of low strato-cumulus at 1800 feet. Ceiling was 9000 feet about 50% of the day and 1800 feet the remainder. Surface winds were light, swinging from north-northeast to east. The sea was slight from northeast.

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5. The small wave disturbance moved eastward rapidly and on D Day the ceiling and visibility were unlimited, with only scattered alto-cumulus and cumulus clouds present. Surface wind was 4 to 8 knots from northeast to southeast, and the sea was slight from the northeast. Weather conditions were excellent for all types of operations on D Day.

6. REMARKS

(a) The most valuable aids to forecasting on this operation were submarine weather reports. These reports, coming from the proper areas, were of invaluable assistance in determining the correct weather situation.

(b) The search plane "in flights" and summaries were also of value, especially in areas to the north and east where the map would have otherwise been blank.

WEATHER SUMMARIES

16 February (D -3)

The day dawned with a low overcast at 1800 feet. Light intermittent rain reduced visibility to 3 - 6 miles. This condition continued until about 1000 when lower clouds broke giving glimpses of an alto-stratus overcast at 8000 feet. Intermittent rain and generally poor but variable visibility continued until 1400. During the remainder of the day, the visibility remained above 12 miles, and ceiling at 9000 feet under a solid alto-stratus overcast. Surface wind was gentle, west to northwesterly. The sea was slight from the northwest. Low ceiling and visibility made conditions for gunfire, spotting, and air-strikes very unsatisfactory during the early morning, and unsatisfactory until about 1400, when they became average.

17 February (D -2)

Broken alto-cumulus clouds at 10,000 feet persisted throughout the day, together with a few lower cumulus. Conditions for operations were good, with ceiling and visibility unlimited, and a slight sea from the north. Surface wind was gentle, north to northwest.

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ENCLOSURE (I) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February (D -1)

An alto-stratus overcast at 9000 feet persisted throughout the day. However, increased strato-cumulus clouds gave a ceiling at 1500 feet during the morning until 0700, and again during midday from 1000 until 1400. Occasional light rain reduced the otherwise 12 mile visibility to 6 miles at times. Conditions for low-level air strikes, close range gunfire, and spotting were satisfactory, but high level bombing was not possible during these times. Surface wind was light, northeasterly, and sea was slight from the northeast.

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON COMMUNICATIONS

1. Upon the arrival of the ESTES at PEARL HARBOR, it was necessary to install considerable additional radio equipment to fit her out for use as flagship of Amphibious Support Force. Thereafter, and until departure for staging port, intensive efforts were made to test thoroughly all equipment and to calibrate on frequencies to be used in the forthcoming operation. In particular, the week's training in company with ELDORADO and AUBURN was invaluable. The actual use of equipment on planned frequencies permitted the correction of minor difficulties in advance of the operation. It also developed data as to which transmitters and antennas could be used on particular frequencies without unacceptable feed-over on other required circuits.

2. Having in mind the necessary alterations and the fact that this is the first operation in which the ESTES has participated, it is considered that the installation rendered excellent service.

3. RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

Enemy radar signals were intercepted (first intercept) as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>PRF</u>	<u>Pulse Width</u>	<u>True Bearing</u>	<u>Type Radar</u>
16 Feb.	0151K	23-32N 141-14E	156	500	7	---	--
16 Feb.	0620K	24-33N 141-09E	101	500	19	350	AS
16 Feb.	2047K	24-58N 141-05E	300	500	10	135	AS
18 Feb.	0342K	24-57N 141-09E	200	500	15	160	AS
18 Feb.	2105K	24-48N 141-10E	100	750	60-65	100	AS

The above radar signals were heard at various times on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th of February.

Jamming, own and enemy:

(a) None noted by the enemy.

(b) Following by own forces:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type of Jamming</u>	<u>Apparent Tactics</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>
16 Feb.	0755K	Noise	To jam 159 mc. enemy radar.	Very good.
19 Feb.	0748K	Noise	Own forces adjusting jammers.	Fair
20 Feb.	0715K	Noise	Own forces adjusting jammers.	Very good.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type of Jamming</u>	<u>Apparent Tactics</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>
21 Feb.	0855K	Noise	Jamming observed from bearing of our force, possibly resulting from erroneous report of enemy radar	Fair, could still read through.

4. PUBLICATIONS

(a) At the time of departure from PEARL HARBOR of Com PhibGrp ONE, Change TWO to CentComTWO and PAC-71 had not been made effective. Some of the ships in company did not have calls assigned in the old Annex B of CentComTWO, and as a temporary expedient, spare voice calls were assigned for use during passage. While enroute, on 21 January, two dispatches were received, one promulgating the effective date of Change 2 and PAC-71 as 3 February, and the other stating that these publications were effective within Task Force 51 as of 23 January. This Movement Task Group (52.11) was a part of Task Force 51, and therefore the new publications, including voice calls and shackle code, were effective within the movement group. Upon arrival at ULITHI, it was then necessary to use the old calls and old shackle with other ships present, and at the same time use the new ones with the ships of Task Force 51. On the 24th, promulgation was made by ComFwdArea that Change 2 and PAC-71 would become effective on 3 February; on the 25th, CincPoa OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 were made effective on 26 January, the latter providing for use of new publication. Use of Change 2 and PAC-71 by ships present at ULITHI was confirmed on 26 January by visual message to all ships present by ComFIFTHFleet. On the 30th, CincPoa message was received, directing delay of effective time of shackle key list until 3 February. To avoid confusion at ULITHI, it was necessary for ComFIFTHFleet to send another all ships message that CentCom TWO Change 2 was effective locally.

(b) The difficulties in providing for every situation are recognized; and the above situation is outlined so that in the future further consideration can be given to the conditions existing at large fleet anchorages in forward areas when putting into effect new publications having general usage.

(c) Annex A to CentComTWO provides a method for referring to frequencies "in the text of despatches and elsewhere by one of the letters" followed by designating numbers and letters. This method does not seem to be universally accepted. For example,

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

certain channel numbers are prescribed by ComEsCarFor for VHF radio channels, differing from "D8 POA Aircraft VHF Channel Designation" contained in the insert on page A42 of Annex A to CentComTWO (Change 2). Also, Task Force 51 Communication Digest for Control Vessels, Small Craft, Beachmasters and Shore Parties, on page 37 lists "Amphibious Task Force Frequencies listed in order of Channel Numbers", which are the channel numbers of Table B4 on page A21, Annex A, CentComTWO Change 2. However, this method does not conform to the prescribed method described on first page of Annex A. It is recommended that a table of Channel Numbers be prepared and included in a Change to CentComTWO, so that all frequencies will be given one channel number and so that there will be uniformity of designating such radio channels among all the Task Units.

5. RADIO

(a) The Radio Frequency Plan for this operation was well conceived and functioned satisfactorily for this Task Force (TF 52) during the pre-D-day period. The Communication Plan of Task Force 51 was considered sufficient, and therefore no separate additional plan was issued by CTF 52.

(b) On the whole, circuit discipline was very good. However, continued command control is essential and daily stress must be laid on the vital necessity of each operator conforming to proper radio discipline and each commanding officer exercising active control of the circuits.

(c) At one time during the few days at ULITHI, circuit discipline on the Fleet Common (34.8 mcs) became very bad. Unauthorized transmissions, particularly at night, of music, obscenity, etc., became so prevalent that it was necessary for ComFIFTHFleet to promulgate an all ships messages directing the suppression of unauthorized transmissions by direct officer supervision, and that the Commanding Officer or Watch Officer must retain personal custody of the microphone where no CWO was available. This directive reduced, but did not eliminate completely, the objectionable transmissions. More active indoctrination of all radio operators (including coxswains and boat crews of small boats) is essential; they must be made to realize that the cluttering of this important warning circuit may result in failure by themselves to receive a vital warning when needed most.

UNCLASSIFIED

(d) Particular commendation is due to Task Units 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 consisting of LCI(L) 627 and LCI(G)'s for the consistent excellence of their communications. Without exception, they answered up promptly when called, and traffic to and from them moved accurately and expeditiously.

(e) More instruction is needed for voice operators. It is not enough for radio operators to know the Radiotelephone procedure, but all individuals (officers and enlisted men other than radiomen), who use the microphone on radio circuits, must study and practice in order that they may use correct procedure. Many do not seem to realize that correct procedure is designed for accuracy and speeding up traffic handling. Among the more common errors may be listed the following:

- Use of both Roger and Wilco.
- Use of Over and Out.
- "Go Ahead" instead of "Send your message".
- "Repeat" instead of "Say again."
- "Error Error Error" instead of "Correction."
- Failing to speak slowly and distinctly.
- Omitting time group needed later for reference.

An excellent practice, which should become doctrine, is to write the message before it is given to the operator to transmit. Likewise, all incoming messages should be written. The increasing use tactically of voice radio circuits requires adherence to standard procedure, as many voice transmissions are now of more than momentary concern and require future reference and action.

(f) Training of radio operators in a general way is essential, but not enough. To make a complicated radio plan work under the stress and strain of an operation, it is absolutely necessary that the operators obtain training in the actual use of the calls and frequencies specified for use in the operation. This creates a real problem, where training is scheduled for forward areas, and in locations where danger of intercept by the enemy is real. However, intercept by the enemy is relatively less important, because sufficient training must be made available to permit our circuits to function and produce the communications which must be used in the operation. Therefore, it is recommended that radio silence restrictions on rehearsals and training circuits be modified, so as to permit training by all personnel with the actual frequencies and calls contained in the communication plan for the operation. Obviously the training must be closely supervised, and it is suggested that provision be made to build up

UNCLASSIFIED

radio traffic of similar nature on the same frequencies at particular locations (such as ULITHI) before and after departure of the Fleet units.

(g) The need for a tactical voice circuit for each task group continues to be apparent. It becomes acute when several large dispositions are attempting to maneuver in the same area, and the Fleet TBS circuit becomes overcrowded. Transport groups can easily use their respective Transport Group Common Frequency (on SCR 608) if the accompanying screen is able to receive and transmit on that frequency. It is recommended that high priority be given to equipping escort type vessels with SCR 608 equipment so that they may so operate with whatever transport group they may be assigned.

(h) Japanese transmissions have been observed on a number of our frequencies. It is believed that this results simply from the fact that the Japanese use many of the same frequencies as we. Only one instance (On Haiku Fox frequency) was noted where Japanese transmissions appeared to be intentional jamming.

(i) Maintenance of radio silence at staging point in forward area was facilitated by the use of Radio Teletype to the shore (on VHF). During the period at ULITHI, there were no transmissions on any normal ship-shore frequency. Necessary operational traffic was passed to the shore radio station for point to point circuits, by means of officer messenger or VHF radio teletype. All traffic of less than OP precedence was flown from ULITHI to Radio GUAM.

(j) Reception of Fleet "foxes" was much better during this operation than in the PALAU operation. One point deserves additional study, - the increasing need for decryption of traffic not addressed to all who need to know. There were several instances when we obtained dispatches, addressed in the heading to others, whereas in the text CTF 52 was included in the addressees. In order to keep abreast of the current operation, it has been necessary to decipher more than 80 percent of the Fleet Fox transmissions, a fourth of which were of no concern to us. There seems to be an increasing tendency to expect all commands to obtain necessary information by "snooping", i.e. decipherment of all traffic to other addressees which may appear to directly concern the decrypting ship. It is recommended that the principle be adhered to, that the originator is responsible for inclusion as action or information addressees all who need to know, and that

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

commands decipher only those dispatches in which they are addressed in the heading. To avoid multitudinous information addressees, it is recommended that further study be given to providing collective calls to fit the particular operation in process of planning.

6. VISUAL

(a) Visual signalling was excellent. Visual silence was observed from sunset to sunrise, during which time limited number of operational dispatches was handled by Nan equipment. In cruising dispositions, the chain of visual responsibility conformed to conventional usage and permitted effective use of Nan equipment at night, particularly for 2000 position reports. In a large fleet anchorage, such as ULITHI, the value of Nan equipment is not so great, because of distances involved and lack of knowledge of exact bearing of addressed ships. We have not found Nan equipment to be effective beyond about 6,000 yards range. It is considerably slower than daylight signalling, and should be reserved for important operational traffic, letting routine administrative traffic wait for daylight methods.

(b) An all-around visual signalling light would be a great help for flagships in a fleet anchorage or at the objective.

(c) The division of ULITHI anchorage into twenty areas of visual responsibility with assigned linking ship in each, was effective in improving visual signalling. Without this arrangement, visual signalling was almost impossible, distances between ships being at times ten or twelve miles with many ships between.

(d) Use of semaphore at short distances has been stressed, but a very small percentage of messages were handled by that method. The principal means of visual signalling was the twelve inch light, but on many occasions, both while cruising and while in objective area, it was necessary to use the twenty-four inch light to reach distant addressees.

(e) While remaining in the objective area at night, the flagship displayed its X-12 Nan beacon (pulsating) for purposes of identification. Other ships were authorized to do likewise. On the first night, the TWIGGS (DD) was attacked by an enemy plane which she shot down. The TWIGGS suggested that the attacking plane may have been aided by a leaky Nan beacon, which may have been damaged during the day by shock of gunfire.

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

7. TBS

(a) The TBS on primary frequency was reserved for tactical and emergency use, and discipline on this circuit was very good. While cruising, the TBS circuit was necessarily used for radar reporting by radar guardships not equipped with VHF equipment for transmitting on 142.02 mcs. At a fleet anchorage, such as ULITHI, it is essential to use TBS at times for logistics. However, the load was lightened by directing ships having a different type common VHF frequency to use that in preference to TBS (APD's 37.2 mcs., LCI(G)'s 38.7 mcs., etc., but this band could not be used from 1000 to 1500 local time daily). These circuits were authorized for use only when visual would not suffice.

(b) TBS number 2, while at ULITHI and when directed (via TBS No. 1) while cruising, was used for MCW transmissions on secondary frequency with ships having two equipments. The use of the fleet anchorage was limited to Flag Officers, battleships and cruisers. It functioned effectively, and permitted the handling of traffic beyond the immediate area over shore station point to point circuits (ships delivering traffic on MCW TBS secondary to flagship, which relayed by VHF Radio Teletype to the shore station). This use was invaluable. It is recommended that similar use be standard practice at fleet anchorages when large numbers of ships are present at times when radio silence on lower frequencies is essential.